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We examine the impact of individual-level motives upon innovative effort and performance in firms.
Drawing from economics and social psychology, we develop a model of the impact of individuals'
motives and incentives upon their innovative effort and performance. Using data on over 11,000 industrial
scientists and engineers (SESTAT 2003), we find that individuals' motives have significant effects
upon innovative effort and performance. These effects vary significantly, however, by the particular
kind of motive (e.g., desire for intellectual challenge vs. pay). We also find that intrinsic and extrinsic
motives affect innovative performance even when controlling for effort, suggesting that motives affect
not only the level of individual effort, but also its quality. Overall, intrinsic motives, particularly the
desire for intellectual challenge, appear to benefit innovation more than extrinsic motives such as pay.
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1  Introduction 
Dating from the 1950’s and early 1960’s, economists such as Schmookler (1962), 
Griliches (1957), Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) have argued that the rate and direction of 
technological change could be understood as the outcome of firms’ rational, profit-driven 
investment in innovation. In making the case for the primacy of profit as a driving force behind 
technical change, economists sensibly focused scholars’ attention on firms and their profit 
incentive since firms are indeed responsible for both a good deal of innovation, and particularly 
its commercialization. In doing so, they subordinated consideration of the impact of individuals 
and their motives on technical advance.  
Individuals’ motives may, however, have important effects on firm innovation. Among 
economists, Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1934; 1942) suggests a critical role of individuals’ 
pecuniary as well as nonpecuniary incentives for entrepreneurship and innovative activity. The 
R&D management literature and case studies also suggest that individuals’ various motives have 
important impacts on innovative activity in firms, and that managers consider the motivation of 
their personnel a key priority (Cohen & Sauermann, 2007; Katz, 2004; Kidder, 1981; Manners, 
Steger, & Zimmerer, 1997; Pelz & Andrews, 1976). Recent explanations of the “paradox” of 
open source software development, namely that programmers develop software code despite the 
apparent absence of financial gain, have also highlighted the role of individual, and especially 
nonpecuniary, incentives associated with software innovation (Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003; 
Lerner & Tirole, 2005; Roberts, Hann, & Slaughter, 2006). Finally, the sociology and economics 
of science literatures have long featured the importance of individual-level motives such as 
intellectual challenge, curiosity and peer recognition in affecting the advance of science 2 
 
(Dasgupta & David, 1994; Merton, 1973; Stephan, 1996; Stephan & Levin, 1992; Zuckerman, 
1988).
1 
Although these literatures suggest an important role of individual-level motives and 
incentives, there is a dearth of large sample empirical research on the importance of individual 
motives and incentives—especially those which are nonpecuniary—for industrial innovation.  
We address this gap in this paper. Drawing from economics and psychology, we first develop a 
simple model of the impact of both pecuniary and nonpecuniary motives on innovation. In our 
empirical analysis, we describe the motives of over 11,000 scientists and engineers employed in 
firm R&D in a wide range of industries. Guided by our model, we then examine the relationships 
between employee motives and, respectively, innovative effort and performance. To prefigure 
the key results, we find that individual-level motives impact individual effort, but also innovative 
performance, controlling for effort. The effects of different types of motives (e.g., income vs. 
intellectual challenge) differ dramatically, however, and also depend on the particular task 
environment. Overall, the nonpecuniary desire for intellectual challenge appears to have the 
strongest positive association with both effort and innovative performance. 
2  Employee Incentives and Innovation 
Our premise is that an individual’s motive to perform an activity depends upon the 
expected pleasurable consequences—or benefits—from engaging in that activity, as well as upon 
the intensity of her preferences for these benefits. We refer to benefits that are contingent upon 
individuals’ employment, effort, or performance as incentives. We refer to individuals’ 
preferences for such contingent work benefits (incentives) as motives. 
                                                       
1 Although typically not concerned with innovation per se, economic theorists have recently expanded 
their consideration of individual incentives to entertain the implications of agents’ nonpecuniary motives 
for institutional design and performance (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005; Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Lacetera & 
Zirulia, 2008; Murdock, 2002). 3 
 
Individuals may respond to a wide range of contingent benefits such as pay, intellectual 
challenge, or peer recognition. Clearly, one might distinguish between nonpecuniary and 
pecuniary benefits. The psychology literature proposes a different (though related) distinction, 
classifying benefits and motives as either extrinsic or intrinsic (Amabile, 1996; Gagne & Deci, 
2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Extrinsic benefits are provided by some environmental entity such as 
a market or actor such as an employer, a superior, or a judging body, and they are typically 
conditioned upon an evaluation of an individual’s effort or task outcome. Extrinsic benefits do 
not result directly from engaging in the task, but are indirect task outcomes. Extrinsic benefits 
are those often considered by economists, and within this class of benefits, economists typically 
focus on pecuniary benefits, which would include tangible rewards such as pay raises, research 
funding, or a paid vacation. In contrast, intrinsic benefits originate within the individual or the 
activity itself—not the environment—and often reflect an interaction between particular 
characteristics of the activity (e.g., challenge of the task) and of the individual (e.g., interest in 
the task).
2 Some intrinsic benefits such as task enjoyment and intellectual challenge are effort-
contingent, realized directly from the process of engaging in certain activities (Amabile, 1996; 
Stephan, 1996). Others such as a feeling of achievement or mastery result from task performance 
or outcomes.  
The nature of individuals’ motives and incentives may have implications for both levels 
of effort as well as the quality or productivity of that effort. Assuming that R&D employees have 
some discretion over how much they actually work, stronger extrinsic and intrinsic motives and 
                                                       
2 This implies that many intrinsic benefits are subjective and do not exist independently from a reference 
individual. A given work attribute may provide an intrinsic benefit in the eyes of one employee but not of 
another; for example, working on a particular research question may appear interesting to one researcher, 
thus conferring intrinsic benefits, while boring another. 4 
 
incentives should influence the level of innovative effort.  The interesting question is the relative 
magnitude of the effect of different motives and incentives on effort.
3 
The effects of different types of motives and incentives on the quality or productivity of 
effort are less obvious.  Camerer and Hogarth (1999) report that pecuniary incentives in 
laboratory settings improve some features of individuals’ cognition, including memory, recall 
and simple problem-solving functions, with the extent of such effects depending upon the nature 
of the task at hand and the capabilities of the individual. Considering the impact of the nature of 
motivation on creativity, Amabile and colleagues argue that intrinsic motivation may stimulate 
creativity by supporting riskier, more exploratory thinking while extrinsic rewards may undercut 
creativity by focusing individuals’ attention on more expedient, more incremental approaches to 
solving problems. At the same time, however, some types of extrinsic rewards may complement 
intrinsic motivation by providing positive feedback (e.g., idea validation) (Amabile, 1996; 
Amabile, 1993; George, 2007; Hennessey & Amabile, 1998).  In addition to possible effects on 
cognition, individuals’ motives may also affect research productivity by driving or inhibiting 
intermediate behaviors, such as information sharing or project selection. For example, a 
scientist’s preference for intellectual challenge may drive her to select more challenging, and 
thus potentially more technologically significant projects.  Alternatively, someone whose work is 
motivated by the desire to minimize the risk of failure may select more incremental tasks with 
                                                       
3 Deci and Ryan and others argue that extrinsic rewards may “crowd-out” intrinsic motivation (Deci, 
Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Frey & Jegen, 2001), possibly reducing overall levels of 
effort.  While our results may reflect such a crowding out effect, crowding out is not the focus of this 
paper. 5 
 
more certain outcomes, and may thus be less likely to achieve technologically significant results 
(cf. Dunbar, 1995).
4  
We conjecture that the productivity effects of motives may depend on the type of task. 
For example, individuals’ choices over intermediate behaviors may matter primarily in upstream 
basic and applied research where they have more latitude in determining how they approach their 
work (cf. Fox, 1983; Holt, 1974).  Similarly, the effects of motives on cognition should matter 
more in upstream research activity requiring more creativity or problem-solving capabilities. 
The effects of motives and incentives on innovation have been little explored in real work 
settings using large sample empirical analysis. One exception is Stern’s (2004) finding that new 
biology PhDs taking jobs in industry were willing to accept, on average, 25% lower salaries if 
prospective employers allowed them to pursue more academic-like science, to publish and 
participate in the scientific community, suggesting that these researchers were willing to pay to 
have the opportunity to pursue nonpecuniary goals. Consistent with the idea of “productivity 
effects” of motives (as well as higher effort levels due to stronger motives), Gambardella et al. 
(2006) observed that European inventors whose patenting was motivated by money, career, and 
prestige concerns tended to produce more valuable patents.  
In this paper, we will examine the relationship between individuals’ motives and their 
innovative effort and performance, using a sample of over 11,000 R&D employees spanning the 
manufacturing and service sectors. 
                                                       
4 Manso et al. provide a complementary perspective on the selection of research approaches. Focusing on 
incentives rather than motives, they suggest that long-term financial incentives may lead individuals to 
adopt more exploratory approaches to addressing technological challenges, while short-term financial 
incentives may encourage individuals to adopt more incremental approaches (Ederer & Manso, 2008; 
Manso, 2006).  6 
 
2.1  Model 
We assume that the utility a researcher realizes from her effort is a function of the cost of 
that effort and of the m different types benefits,  , k=1…m, that result from that effort.  Each 
type of benefit from work can have a component that is contingent upon the quantity of effort, E, 
and a component that depends upon innovative output, Q, which one can think of as some quality 
adjusted number of inventions.
5 Accordingly,  
  ,                (1) 
where  , and  . The variables   and  reflect the 
incentives (i.e., contingent benefits) facing the researcher, and we assume that  0 and  0. 
The subutility   derived from a particular type of benefit   is 
  ,              (2) 
where  .    reflects an individual’s motives—her intensity of preference for a given 
benefit, and a stronger motive of a particular type, k, increases the individual’s marginal utility 
derived from the associated k’th benefit. For simplicity, we assume motives and incentives to be 
exogenous.  
The researcher also incurs a cost of effort, 
                  (3) 
where   and  .  
                                                       
5 Benefits may also have a component that is contingent only upon employment in a particular job (e.g., 
fixed salary). However, since employment-contingent benefits do not affect optimal effort or performance 
in our model, we focus on effort and performance contingent benefits. Also, while our model allows all 
types of benefits to be contingent upon both effort and performance, any given type of benefit may be 
predominantly contingent upon one of these. For example, the utility derived from intellectual challenge 
is primarily effort contingent whereas peer recognition will be primarily performance contingent. 7 
 
The researcher’s output, Q, is a function of her effort as well as her productivity (i.e., 
. We assume innovative productivity to be a function of a vector T of industry characteristics 
(e.g., technological opportunity), firm characteristics (e.g., size, resources, organizational 
structure, etc.), and individual characteristics (e.g., ability).  In addition to motives (I ) and 
incentives   affecting the level of effort, we also allow them to affect productivity such that: 
Q = Q(E; T, I,  ),              (4) 
where  and  . In Section 2 above, we suggest that the “productivity 
effects” of particular motives and incentives (e.g.,    ) may be positive or negative.  For 
example, while desire for intellectual challenge may stimulate innovative productivity, the desire 
to minimize the risk of failure may have the opposite effect.  We also hypothesized that the 
magnitude of the effect of motives on productivity is likely to depend upon the nature of the 
task—whether it affords more discretion, or demands greater creativity. 
We will now assume that the researcher has unbiased expectations of her productivity as 
well as of the effort and performance contingent benefits and chooses a utility-maximizing level 
of effort, E*.  Assuming that the subutilities enter additively, the total utility function is: 
U =  .      (5) 
Assuming (5) to be concave in effort over the relevant range, the optimal amount of effort 
E*  is implicitly defined by the first order condition:  
 =    = 0.        (6) 
Applying the implicit function theorem to (6) shows, first, that optimal effort,  E* ,  
decreases in the marginal cost of effort,    Second, optimal effort is a positive function of  8 
 
and thus of the factors that drive innovative productivity. Third, and of particular importance for 
our empirical analysis below, (6) also implies that: 
  .           (7) 
The denominator in (7), which is the second order condition, is negative by assumption. 
The numerator shows that the qualitative effect of   on E* depends on the productivity effects 
of motives,   , since, of all the terms in the numerator of the right hand side of equation (7), 
only   can be negative.  Thus, the effect of a particular motive   on optimal effort is negative 
if and only if   has a sufficiently large relative negative effect on productivity. Finally, equation 
(7) also shows that the effect of   on optimal effort is conditioned by the associated incentives, 
and  .
6  
In addition to addressing the effects of motives on innovative effort, our model also 
speaks to the determinants of innovative output, Q.  It is trivial to see that effort will positively 
affect output.  As suggested by our discussion of equation (4), we also expect motives to affect 
innovative output even controlling for effort.  However, this qualitative effect of motives on 
productivity may differ, depending upon the specific motive.  For example, as noted above, a 
desire for challenge may be associated with greater productivity, while the desire to minimize the 
risk of failure may reduce it. 
                                                       
6 Although we do not empirically consider the impact of incentives on effort due to data limitations, it is 
easy to show, with application of the implicit function theorem to (7), that the qualitative effects of 
incentives,   and  on effort depend on their productivity effects. Specifically, if a given incentive has 
no negative productivity effects, then increasing it will yield higher effort. Similar to the result regarding 
the effect of a given motive, if the productivity effect of an incentive is negative and sufficiently large, 
then increasing that incentive will diminish effort. 9 
 
In the following, we examine the impact of individuals’ motives on innovative effort and 
performance empirically. Since we are unable to estimate the model directly given our data, we 
will test its qualitative implications.  Just as importantly, the model also guides our interpretation 
of the results.   
3  Data 
For our empirical analysis, we use restricted-use data from the 2003 Scientists and 
Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT). The SESTAT database is maintained by the NSF 
(National Science Foundation, 2003) and the sample population includes individuals who have a 
science, engineering or related degree or who worked in a science, engineering or related 
occupation at the time the data were collected. Most data were collected via a mailed 
questionnaire; a smaller number of surveys were administered by computer-aided telephone 
interviews, in-person interviews, and via the internet. Response rates for the three component 
surveys ranged from 60-80%.
7 
We focus on a sample of 11,014 SESTAT respondents who possess Bachelors, Masters, 
or PhD degrees, and are employees of private for-profit firms active in a wide range of industries 
(see Table A1 in appendix). A majority of our respondents—6,049, or 54.9%—work in 
manufacturing, though a sizable minority—4,373 or 39.7%—work in services, with 1,496 
respondents in R&D services. We include only respondents whose primary work classification is 
basic research, applied research, development, design, or computer applications; the distribution 
of respondents across these work types is shown in Table 1. Note that 3,649 respondents, or 
33.1%, work in computer applications. Also, only 381, or 3.5% of the sample, work in basic 
                                                       
7 For more information on the SESTAT data, including the survey instruments, see http://sestat.nsf.gov. 10 
 
research, a proportion which is comparable to the share of R&D firms spend on basic research in 
the U.S. more generally (cf. National Science Board, 2008). 
We were able to obtain two important additional control variables—firm identities and 
the school awarding the respondent’s PhD (employed below as a proxy measure for ability) —
for a subset of our respondents comprised entirely of PhDs (n=2,805). We use this subsample 
(“PhD-sample”) in a series of robustness checks. Apart from the fact that the PhD-sample is 
comprised entirely of PhDs, the key difference between the two samples is that the PhD-sample 
has relatively fewer respondents in design and computer applications (see Table A2 in appendix). 
4  Measures 
Unless otherwise indicated, all measures are taken from respondents’ survey 
questionnaires and are included in the SESTAT database. As we show below, the SESTAT data 
provide some unique measures reflecting a wide range of motives, as well as measures of our 
two key dependent variables, innovative effort and performance. Descriptive statistics for all 
measures are shown in Table 1; correlations are shown in Table A5 in the appendix. 
 
Dependent Variables: Innovative Effort and Performance 
Quantity of effort: Respondents reported the number of hours they work on their main job 
in a typical work week (continuous measure). We use this measure as a proxy for the quantity of 
effort dedicated to innovation (HRSWORKED). Mean effort in our sample is 45 hours, with a 
range of 35 - 96. 
Innovative Performance: Each respondent reports the number of U.S. patent applications 
in which he or she was named as an inventor over the last 5 years prior to the survey (USPAPP). 
The average number of U.S. patent applications per respondent over the prior five years is 1.2. 
Patent application rates are considerably higher in basic research (1.44), applied research (2.53) 11 
 
and development (1.67) than in design (0.77) and computer applications (0.23). The distribution 
is highly skewed with only 24% of cases reporting any applications, and only 10% reporting 
more than 2 applications.  
Patent application output is an imperfect measure of innovative performance. First, not all 
inventions are patented (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000). Thus, as discussed below, we include 
several industry and firm level variables to control for the likelihood of whether a given 
invention is patented. Another recognized limitation is the enormous variability in the technical 
importance and economic value of patented innovations. To assess the robustness of our results 
to this latter limitation, we also employ the self-reported number of granted patents (mean 0.60).  
Even more revealing, another alternative measure is the number of granted patents licensed or 
resulting in a commercialized product (mean 0.26) because such patents would tend to reflect 
more valuable inventions (see appendix). 
 
Featured Independent Variables: Motives (Preferences for Work Benefits) 
Our measure for motives (  in our model) are respondents’ ratings of the importance of 
eight work benefits in response to the following question: “When thinking about a job, how 
important is each of the following factors to you . . .”   The importance of each benefit was 
scored on a 4-point scale anchored by 1 (very important) and 4 (not important at all); for ease of 
interpretability, we reverse coded these items such that higher scores indicate higher importance. 
The eight work benefits and their associated motives are: salary (IMP_SAL), fringe benefits 
(IMP_BEN), job security (IMP_SEC), intellectual challenge (IMP_CHAL), independence 12 
 
(IMP_IND), opportunities for advancement (IMP_ADV), responsibility (IMP_RESP), and 
contribution to society (IMP_SOC).
8 
The means and standard deviations for the motive measures are reported in Table 1. The 
correlations between the eight motives vary considerably, ranging from -0.01 to 0.50, with only 
about a third exceeding 0.30. Relatively low mean correlations suggest that the eight measures 
reflect distinct constructs and are not obviously subject to a common methods bias.
9 We report 
more detailed analyses of the preferences measures in the appendix, including a factor analysis 
and comparisons of motives across different types of individuals. 
 
Additional Measures 
  The table below briefly describes the other variables and associated measures employed 
in our analyses. 








Dummies for 28 industries (2- to 4-digit NAICS classification). Industry 
dummies are intended to control for differences in technological opportunity 
and other industry-level conditions affecting R&D productivity, as well as for 
cross-industry differences in patent propensities (Cohen et al., 2000). 
Employer firm size 
(EMSIZE) 
Respondents were asked to estimate the number of employees in their firm in 
all locations.  We represent their categorical responses by a set of dummy 
variables: EMSIZE1: 10 or fewer employees; EMSIZE2: 11-24; EMSIZE3: 
25-99; EMSIZE4: 100-499; EMSIZE5: 500-999; EMSIZE6: 1000-4999; 
EMSIZE7: 5000-24999; EMSIZE8: 25000+ employees. 
Firm age 
(NEWBUS) 
Dummy = 1 if firm was founded within the last five years 
                                                       
8 As discussed below, while providing rich data on researchers’ motives, the available measures are 
limited.  For example, our interviews have suggested two other motives that may importantly affect R&D 
employees behavior—the desire to solve practical problems and the desire to contribute to a project team. 
9 Self-reported motives may be affected by social desirability bias (Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992). Such a 
bias is problematic for our econometric analysis if it affects the correlations between motives and 
outcome measures. While we cannot explicitly assess the presence of social desirability bias in our data, 
we see no compelling reason to expect a significant bias.  13 
 
Firm fixed effects 
(EMPLIDCT) 
Employer names are available for our PhD-sample.
 We created a set of 122 
dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects for each firm that had at least 
5 individuals in our PhD-sample (EMPLIDCT5).
  
Primary work type 
(WAPRI) 
Respondents indicated on which of a list of work activities they spend the most 




Respondents indicated which of a list of 9 non-R&D work activities 
(accounting, employee relations, management, production, professional 
services, sales/marketing, quality management, teaching, other) occupied more 
than 10% of their time.
 We summed the number of these activities to control 




Dummy coding for Bachelors, Masters, and PhD  
Ability 
(ABILITY) 
For our PhD-sample, we had the names of the PhD-granting institution. We 
matched these institution names and the PhD field to the National Research 
Council’s evaluation of PhD program quality (Goldberger, Flattau, & Maher, 
1995). The particular quality measure used is a survey rating of “program 
effectiveness in educating research scholars and scientists”. The scale ranges 
from 0 (“not effective”) to 5 (“extremely effective”). While this measure 
formally captures the quality of an individual’s graduate education, it is also 
likely to reflect innate ability to the extent that high-ability individuals self-
select or are selected into high-quality PhD programs. 
Field of highest 
degree 
(HD_FIELD) 
Dummy coding for 16 fields (biology, health/medical sciences, food sciences, 
chemistry, physics, earth sciences, computer science, materials science, 
metallurgical engineering, aerospace/astronautical engineering, computer 





Time since obtaining highest degree, in years. Serves as measures of field-
specific skills and knowledge. In addition, this measure could also capture 
cohort effects (Stephan, 1996). We also have measures of individuals’ age and 
tenure in the current job. Since both variables are highly correlated with 
HD_TENURE, we only include the latter in our key regressions. Robustness 




Extent to which the current work is related to the field of the highest degree, 3-
point scale; serves as measure of relevance of the skills and knowledge 
acquired during academic training. 
Control variables   
Salary 
(LN_SALARY) 
Respondents reported their current basic annual salary, not  including bonuses 
or overtime compensation. The salary distribution is highly skewed and we use 
the natural log of this variable in our econometric analyses (LN_SALARY). 
Since base salary is not predicted to affect effort or performance in our model, 




Two dummy variables indicating whether the individual’s work was supported 
by a contract with / a grant from the U.S. department of defense or the NASA. 
We expect that findings resulting from such work are less likely to be disclosed 




Natural log of the number of people the respondent supervises directly. 
Gender (MALE)  Dummy =1 if respondent is male 
Race (RACE)  Dummies for white, Asian, black, other 
US citizenship 
(USCITIZEN) 
Dummy = 1 for U.S. citizens 
Marital status 
(MARRIED) 
Coded 1 for individuals who are married or living in a marriage-like 
relationship. Married individuals presumably have more family obligations 
than individuals who are not married. This variable serves as a proxy for time 
constraints in our effort regressions. 
Children 
(CHILDREN011) 
Count of children under the age of 12 living in the same household as the 




5  Specifications and Estimation 
5.1  Specifications 
We estimate two sets of regressions, distinguished by the two dependent variables: 1.) 
Innovative effort, measured by HRSWORKED; and 2.) innovative performance, measured by 
USPAPP.  In the effort regressions, we regress HRSWORKED on measures of: 1.) motives 2.) 
variables affecting individuals’ average productivity, and 3.) control variables. Contrasting this 
specification with our theoretical model suggests several important differences that affect the 
interpretation of our results. First, we do not have measures for the incentives facing our 
respondents (  and  in our model). Since incentives condition the effect of motives on 
optimal effort (see equation 7 above), a lack of measures for incentives implies that estimated 
coefficients of the motives ( ) reflect a compound effect of the motives and of the unobserved 
incentives. Our qualitative predictions for the effects of the motives should, however, still hold 
as long as the motives and associated incentives are either uncorrelated or positively correlated. 
The latter can be expected in light of research suggesting that individuals self-select into 
organizations offering benefits that “fit” their preferences (Cable & Edwards, 2004; Holland, 
1997; Sauermann, 2005), suggesting a positive relationship between benefits and the respective 15 
 
motives, and, as a consequence, between incentives and motives. Second, our model also 
predicts an interaction between the determinants of R&D productivity and individuals’ motives. 
We estimated multiplicative models, but the interactive terms were never significant. Thus, we 
focus on main effects alone. 
In our performance regressions, we regress patent applications (USPAPP) on measures of 
1.) motives 2.) effort 3.) variables affecting individuals’ productivity and 4.) control variables. 
For the full sample, we focus our discussion on additive specifications of the performance 
regressions since interaction terms including effort and various productivity determinants turned 
out to be insignificant. Consistent with our model, however, the interaction between effort and 
ability is significant in the PhD-sample where a better measure of ability (quality of graduate 
education) is available. 
5.2  Estimation Issues 
5.2.1  Distribution of Dependent Variables 
Our sample includes only individuals who are full-time employees, defined as working 
an average of at least 35 hours per week. Since OLS can produce inconsistent results for 
truncated dependent variables, we feature truncated regression in our analysis of effort. 
The number of U.S. patent applications filed over the prior five years (USPAPP) is a 
discrete measure of innovative performance and, as noted above, has a skewed distribution with 
only 24% of our respondents having one or more patent applications. A family of count models 
that accounts for skewed count outcomes and also allows for different processes generating zero 
counts are zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). 
Estimating a ZINB model amounts to simultaneously estimating two regression models. One 
model is a logit predicting membership in an “always-0” group, where individuals are not at risk 16 
 
of patenting (e.g., because of the nature of their work or because of firm policies regarding 
secrecy). The other is a negative binomial model for those cases that are not in the “always-0” 
group. In our ZINB models, we excluded several individual-level variables, such as our 
preference measures, HDTENURE, and LN_SUPDIR from the logit component, emphasizing 
the role of firm characteristics (firm size, startup status, industry) and individuals’ type of work, 
field of highest degree, and type of degree in affecting the likelihood of an individual being at 
risk of patenting. In addition, the logit component includes two dummy variables indicating 
whether the individual’s research was funded by a contract with or grant from the Department of 
Defense or the NASA. All count models are adjusted for exposure time because some 
respondents have fewer than five years work experience.  
5.2.2  Endogeneity  
The cross-sectional nature of our data warrants careful consideration of endogeneity, 
especially with respect to individuals’ motives. Economists routinely assume individuals’ 
motives and preferences to be exogenous and stable, and many social psychologists consider 
preferences for work attributes to be “trait-like”—i.e., relatively stable over time (cf. Amabile, 
Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994; Cable et al., 2004). It is, however, conceivable that individuals’ 
reported preferences change in response to realized performance and benefits. For example, 
individuals may rationalize the receipt of little financial reward from their innovative efforts by 
reporting that such rewards matter little to them (cf. Festinger, 1957). To investigate this 
possibility with respect to the one type of preference where we have some data on the actual 
level of the benefit (though not so clearly a contingent benefit), we examined the correlation 17 
 
between the importance of salary (IMP_SAL), the satisfaction with salary,
10 and actual 
(logarithmized) salary levels (LN_SALARY). IMP_SAL and LN_SALARY are not significantly 
correlated (r=-0.01, n.s.), while the correlation between satisfaction with salary (SAT_SAL) and 
LN_SALARY is positive and highly significant (r=0.19, p<0.001). These correlations suggest 
that, while satisfaction with a particular benefit may depend on its level, the rated importance of 
the benefit—i.e., the motive—is largely exogenous. We will consider the potential for 
endogeneity of motives in more detail below. 
With innovative effort (HRSWORKED) on the right hand side of our performance 
regressions, we consider the possibility that innovative effort may be endogenous with respect to 
realized performance. According to our model, effort is exogenous with respect to realized 
performance, but is endogenous with respect to expected performance to the extent respondents 
believe future performance is associated with performance-contingent benefits. Thus, 
HRSWORKED may be endogenous in these regressions if individuals’ expectations with respect 
to benefits and performance are influenced by their past performance. Using CHILDREN011 
and MARRIED as instruments for effort, we did not find evidence for endogeneity of 
HRSWORKED in any of our performance regressions.
11  
 
                                                       
10 Our respondents reported their satisfaction with the eight work benefits in their current job. While 
satisfaction will generally be a positive function of realized benefits, it is a complex psychological 
construct, which is still not well understood (Cable et al., 2004; Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001). 
Thus, we do not use satisfaction scores as measures of either the level of benefits or of incentives in our 
empirical analysis. 
11We tested for endogeneity by including the residual from an OLS first-stage effort regression into 
different specifications of second-stage performance regressions (Wooldridge, 2001). The instruments for 
effort, CHILDREN011 and MALExCHILDREN011, are jointly significant (F(2,10936)=11.31). We 
estimated performance regressions using Poisson, negative binomial, and zero-inflated negative binomial 
models with robust as well as bootstrapped standard errors. The first-stage residual was never significant 
(Chi2(1)=1.69, p=0.19 for the NBREG case). Given this result and given the lack of an appropriate 
instrument for performance, we did not estimate the effort and performance regressions simultaneously as 
a system. 18 
 
6  Results 
6.1  Effort 
Table 2 reports the results of our effort regressions. Column 1 shows the results of a 
regression of HRSWORKED on the variables conditioning productivity and other controls. In 
model 2, we add our measures of respondents’ motives. Four of the measures have significant 
effects on effort. The measure of the desire for intellectual challenge (IMP_CHAL) has the 
strongest positive effect, followed by the importance of responsibility and independence. What is 
notable about these results is the dominance of an intrinsic motive—desire for intellectual 
challenge. 
In addition to these positive effects, we observe a significant negative coefficient for the 
importance of salary. According to our model, such a negative coefficient would be expected 
only if the salary motive also has a strong negative effect on productivity. However, as our 
performance regressions below show, the productivity effect of the salary motive is actually 
positive. Thus, a more likely explanation for the negative effect of the salary motive on effort is 
that the importance of salary reported by individuals reflects their opportunity cost of time, 
which should have a negative effect on effort. We should, however, not make too much of this 
negative coefficient because it is observed only for non- PhDs (cf. Table A6).
12  
While our model does not predict an effect of basic (non-contingent) salary on 
individuals’ effort, we also estimated an effort regression including LN_SALARY as an 
                                                       
12 In order to address high correlations between some of the preference measures, we also estimated the 
truncated regression models with one preference measure at a time. All eight measures are individually 
significant, with negative effects of the importance of salary, benefits, and job security, and positive 
effects of the other five measures. On the basis of the model reported in Table 2, col. 2, we also tested 
various subsets of coefficients for joint significance. The measures of the importance of salary, job 
security, and fringe benefits correspond to the class of extrinsic motives; these three measures are jointly 
highly significant (Chi2(3)=38.94, p<0.001). Of the remaining five preference measures, the importance 
of challenge, independence, and advancement map most clearly to intrinsic factors; these 3 measures are 
also jointly significant (Chi2(3)=40.30, p<0.001). 19 
 
additional control (model 3). Its inclusion yields slight changes in the coefficients of the 
measures of some motives, but the qualitative results remain unchanged. The negative effect of 
IMP_SAL becomes even stronger. Salary itself has a large positive coefficient. However, we are 
cautious in interpreting this result since we do not have adequate instruments to address potential 
simultaneity between effort and salary. 
We conducted robustness checks involving different estimation methods as well as 
different subsamples (see appendix). The positive effects of the importance of challenge as well 
as responsibility are very robust, while the effects of the importance of independence and salary 
are fragile. Also, using the limited sample of PhD respondents, we were able to include a much 
better control for ability. These results show ABILITY has the expected positive effect on effort.  
Most importantly, the inclusion of this measure has no noticeable effect on the estimated 
coefficients for our motive variables. 
Finally, the coefficients of some of our control variables also deserve attention (Table 2, 
model 2). For example, we find that the amount of time spent on the job increases with the 
number of different (non-R&D) tasks the individual regularly performs (WA_NONRD). Also, 
women with children between the ages of 0 and 11 work significantly fewer hours than 
individuals without children. PhDs spend more time on the job than respondents with either 
Masters or Bachelor’s degrees. Finally, our results suggest that effort varies significantly by firm 
size and firm age. These differences in motives and effort across firm types are examined in 
more detail in a companion paper (Sauermann & Cohen, 2007).  20 
 
6.2  Innovative Performance 
6.2.1  Main Analyses 
Our model predicts that individuals’ motives may affect innovative output even 
controlling for the quantity of effort (“productivity effects”). We examine these relationships in a 
series of zero-inflated negative binomial regressions reported in Table 3. Model 1 includes only 
our control variables. We observe that PhDs have a significantly larger number of patent 
applications than non- PhDs and that individuals engaged in applied R&D have more patent 
applications than individuals in development (omitted category).  Individuals engaged in 
computer applications and systems design have the lowest number of patent applications. The 
number of patent applications also increases with the number of subordinates (LN_SUPDIR). 
Finally, while the relevance of training (JOBDEGREE) has a small positive coefficient, time 
since graduation (HDTENURE) is insignificant.
13 Column 1b shows the results of the logit 
component of the zero-inflated negative binomial model.
14 
In model 2, we include our measures of individuals’ motives. The coefficients on these 
measures reflect the “total effect” of motives and preferences on performance since the 
specification does not yet include effort, which should play a mediating role. The importance of 
challenge and independence as well as that of salary have significant positive effects.  With a 
significantly larger coefficient than that for IMP_SAL (p<0.05), a one-SD higher score on the 
challenge measure, IMP_CHAL implies a 19.8% higher expected patent count, while the same 
                                                       
13 We also have a measure of the respondent’s tenure in the current job, potentially reflecting the amount 
of job-specific human capital (JOBTENURE). When included in addition to the (highly correlated) 
measure HDTENURE, JOBTENURE has a positive effect on performance, while having a negative effect 
on innovative effort. 
14Recall that the logit regression predicts membership in the “never patenting” group, i.e., positive 
coefficients indicate a lower likelihood of patenting. As expected, Masters and PhDs are more likely to 
patent than are Bachelors (omitted category) and individuals in basic research, design, and computer 
applications are less likely to patent than individuals in development. 21 
 
change in the preference for salary implies a 9.2 % higher expected count. Recall, however, that 
these estimates are likely to reflect compound effects of both individuals' motives and of the 
associated unobserved incentives. The positive effect of IMP_SAL on performance is notable 
given its negative effect on effort. One interpretation is that individuals who care much about 
salary find ways to use their time more efficiently, e.g., by reducing the time of “unnecessary” 
tinkering and focusing on producing patentable output. Another finding is that the importance of 
job security (IMP_SEC) is negatively related to performance, with a one-SD higher score on the 
job security measure implying an 11.9% lower expected patent count. Note that the effect sizes 
of some of the measures of motives are considerably larger than those of our measures of 
experience (HDTENURE, JOBDEGREE) and, in the sample of PhDs, comparable to the effects 
of ABILITY (see appendix). Although relative magnitudes of the these effects depend strongly 
on the reliability and validity of measures, these results suggest that individuals’ motives may be 
at least as important for performance as knowledge and experience. 
 In model 3, we include only our controls and the measure of effort (HRSWORKED). 
Here, HRSWORKED is positive and highly significant. According to this model, a one-standard 
deviation  higher level of effort (6.6 hours) implies a 12.4% higher expected count of U.S. patent 
applications. Next, we estimated a model including HRSWORKED as well as the eight motive 
measures (model 4). Changes in the motive coefficients compared to model 2 (without effort) 
reflect the extent to which effort mediates the relationship between motives and performance. 
The mediation effects are small, suggesting that most of the effect of motives on performance 
occurs through what we call “productivity effects”. For example, the coefficient on the 
importance of challenge remains very large and is equivalent to 18.7% higher expected patent 
counts for a one SD change in the challenge measure.  22 
 
As discussed earlier, these results could reflect impacts of motives and incentives on 
cognitive processes (e.g., recall and creativity) or on intermediate outcomes such as project 
choice. For example, the positive productivity effects of the importance of challenge and 
independence would be consistent with positive effects of intrinsic motives on creativity. 
Similarly, the negative effect of the security motive would be consistent with the argument made 
above that individuals concerned with job security may also be motivated by a desire to avoid 
failure in their projects, and that such risk averse individuals may gravitate towards projects and 
approaches that are more incremental and certain, offer less innovative potential and are thus less 
likely to result in patents (cf. Dunbar, 1995; Ederer et al., 2008). 
Even though our results suggest only a modest role of the preference for salary in 
affecting innovative performance, they do not imply that actual pay and other extrinsic benefits 
are not beneficial. In fact, in model 5 (Table 3), where LN_SALARY is included as an additional 
control, the large, significant coefficient suggests a strong, positive effect of pay on innovative 
performance. Due to the lack of suitable instruments, we are, however, unable to disentangle the 
causal nature of this relationship, and salary may be endogenous to the extent that individual 
performance is serially correlated and those who performed well in the past receive higher base 
pay in subsequent periods. However, it is also conceivable that sufficiently high levels of pay 
and financial resources more generally may be beneficial for innovation because they allow 
individuals to focus on the work of innovation rather than worrying about their livelihoods.  
Most important for our analysis, the inclusion of LN_SALARY yields only negligible changes in 
the coefficients of motives.  
We hypothesized above that the productivity effects of motives and incentives may vary 
across types of tasks, and suggested that the productivity effects of motives may be greater in 23 
 
task settings that require more creativity and provide greater autonomy. Column 6 reports 
estimates for the sample of respondents engaged in basic or applied research (mean 
USPAPP=2.37) and column 7 reports the estimates for those engaged in development (mean 
USPAPP=1.67). Our key extrinsic motive, the importance of salary (IMP_SAL), and our key 
intrinsic motive, IMP_CHAL, both have significant, positive impacts on productivity for the 
respondents engaged in basic or applied research, but neither variable has a significant effect in 
development. Similarly, the importance of job security has a significantly larger negative effect 
in basic/applied research than in development. The importance of independence, however, has a 
stronger effect in development. Our interpretation of these results is that motives generally—
whether intrinsic or extrinsic—can have stronger productivity effects in R&D work that is less 
routinized, more demanding of creative solutions, and where employees have more discretion 
over the approaches they follow.  One surprising result is that, while highly significant in the 
development subsample, HRSWORKED is insignificant in the basic/applied research subsample.  
This result may reflect the notion that for research tasks demanding more problem solving and 
creativity, it is not the time expended beyond the 35 hour lower threshold that has an effect as 
much as the quality of the mental effort.
15  Alternatively, for upstream research where individual 
motives matter more, hours at the office may not accurately reflect total effort expended.  For 
example, individuals motivated by intellectual challenge may dedicate substantial time outside of 
the office to coming up with solutions, etc., rendering a count of hours worked a very noisy 
measure of the quantity of effort. 
                                                       
15 Note that the different effects of motives across types of R&D also support our assumption that motives 
are to a large degree exogenous to performance because any effects of performance on motives should be 
similarly strong across types of R&D. 24 
 
6.2.2  Robustness Checks
16 
First, we addressed the concern that our performance measure, the number of patent 
applications, inaccurately measures innovative output—especially valuable innovations—by 
estimating performance regressions using granted patents (USPGRT) and, most importantly, 
commercialized patents (USPCOM). While the effect of effort is reduced in regressions using 
USPGRT and the effect of the independence motive becomes insignificant in regressions using 
USPCOM, these analyses generally strengthen our finding of significant effects of effort on 
performance and of significant productivity effects of motives. 
Second, in light of the possibility that our measures of motives may be conflated with 
respondent ability, we estimated key performance regressions using the PhD subsample for 
which we have a better measure of ability (rankings of respondents’ graduate programs). As 
expected, ABILITY has a positive association with performance. Moreover, the ABILITY-
HRSWORKED interaction is positive and significant. Most importantly, however, the inclusion 
of this measure has virtually no impact on the coefficient estimates of the motives of intellectual 
challenge, salary, independence and job security. Finally, to probe whether we may be observing 
firm-level rather than individual-level effects, our Ph.D. subsample allowed the inclusion of firm 
fixed effects firms with 5 or more individuals in our sample. The coefficients of many of the 
measures of the motives are somewhat reduced, suggesting that individuals’ motives may differ 
systematically across firms. However, the productivity effects of the importance of salary, 
intellectual challenge, independence, and job security remain large and significant. 
 
                                                       
16 These and other robustness checks are discussed in more detail in the appendix. 25 
 
7  Discussion 
Our results suggest that researchers’ motives matter for innovative effort and 
performance. First, desires for challenging work and responsibility appear to elicit more effort in 
R&D. Second, controlling for effort, preferences for challenge, independence, and, to a lesser 
extent, salary are associated with superior performance, with the effect of challenge being large 
and easily dominating any other. Moreover, a strong preference for job security is consistently 
associated with sub-par performance. Interestingly, these productivity effects of motives appear 
to be much stronger in basic and applied R&D, compared to development. 
Our key results are robust across different estimation methods and the inclusion of 
controls for firm effects as well as individuals’ ability and work experience.  Unfortunately, the 
SESTAT data did not provide measures for a number of motives that our interviews suggest may 
be quite important for those employed in R&D, including the desire to solve practical problems 
(as distinct from intellectual challenge), and the motive to contribute to the work of a team.  
In addition to the desire for income playing a modest role, the two strongest, robust 
relationships are the positive one between the desire for intellectual challenge and innovative 
performance and the negative one between the desire for job security and performance.  
Notwithstanding the psychological research that motivates a good deal of our empirical research, 
we cannot identify the underlying sources of these effects.  One explanation offered by the 
literature is that these preferences for challenge and security may condition intermediate 
behaviors, such as the kinds of projects that researchers might select.  A second, and not 
mutually exclusive explanation, is an impact on cognition itself.  A third possibility, not 
discussed above, is that these preferences may be linked to other individual traits affecting 
innovation.  For example, desire for intellectual challenge may indicate that a respondent has a 
preference for novel experiences, and that tasks providing novelty are consequently pleasurable 26 
 
for such individuals.  Work in neuroscience suggests that such pleasurable motivational states 
elicit hemispheric activity that, in turn, affects individuals’ scope of attention and problem-
solving capabilities (Friedman & Foerster, 2005; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004).  Similarly, those 
who are concerned with job security may be predisposed to fear or anxiety, and Friedman and 
Foerster (2005) observe that perceptions of threat elicit distinctive hemispheric activity that tends 
to suppress creativity. 
  A potential concern with our empirical results is that our measures for motives are 
endogenous.  We do not have instruments or time series data that would allow one to assess, no 
less correct for, the possibility.  Yet, our corollary analyses, while not directly addressing the 
concern, tend to mitigate it. 
17 Given that this is the first time these strong relationships between 
individuals’ motives and innovative activity have been observed in large sample empirical 
research on innovation, future study is needed to examine the underlying drivers. 
Policy and managerial implications of our findings are several. For managers, the 
findings highlight the importance of intrinsic motivation for innovative performance. 
Accordingly, management should consider the returns to the provision of intrinsic benefits, while 
of course recognizing the associated costs and challenges. Nonpecuniary incentives can provide 
leverage where pecuniary incentives tend to be less effective, such as when the link between 
effort and performance is highly uncertain or when agents’ behaviors and performance are hard 
to observe by principals, conditions which are often characteristic of R&D (cf. Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972; Ouchi, 1979; Prendergast, 1999). Moreover, individuals engaged in innovation 
                                                       
17 For example, as noted above, while we find a strong correlation between salary levels and measures of 
satisfaction with salary, there is no correlation between our measure of the preference for salary (i.e., the 
salary motive) and salary levels.  Moreover, if endogeneity were present, one would then expect to 
observe similar relationships between motives and performance across the full range of innovative 
activities, including development, but the observed relationships are largely confined to basic and applied 
research.   27 
 
appear to have particularly strong preferences for nonpecuniary benefits, potentially providing 
such benefits with a very high motivating “power.”  The challenge of appealing to employees’ 
intrinsic motives is that intrinsic benefits typically cannot be provided directly. Organizations 
can, however, control them indirectly to some degree, through facilitating or enabling conditions 
such as task assignments, greater autonomy (Deci et al., 1985; Hackman & Oldham, 1976), or 
supporting scientists’ desire to participate in professional communities (cf. Stern, 2004).  
Management also needs to recognize, however, that appealing to individuals’ motives can 
occasionally detract from organizational goals. For example, there are cases where individuals 
pursued research projects out of their own interest, against explicit policies of management. 
While such projects have sometimes yielded high returns for the employing organization (Katz, 
1993; Kidder, 1981), they can also diminish firm performance.  Researchers’ pursuit of their 
intrinsic or professional interests can at times detract from their firm’s interests, as when the 
desire for peer recognition motivates an industrial scientist to disseminate research findings that 
the employer would prefer to keep secret. 
For policy makers, our results suggest that policies that encourage educational institutions 
to strengthen and reinforce intrinsic motivation, including love of challenge, curiosity, etc., may 
offer social dividends. At the same time, policies that change the incentives of individuals 
engaged in innovation should be evaluated in light of the complex ways in which such changes 
may affect not only the rate and direction of research effort, but its productivity as well.
18      
                                                       
18 A possible example of such a policy that applies to academic research is the Bayh-Dole Amendment 
enabling academic institutions to hold patents to their inventions as a matter of course, and the associated 
awarding of a share of licensing and other income to the academic inventors. 28 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Type Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent  uspapp count 11014 1.19 4.50 0 96
variables uspgrt count 11014 0.60 2.88 0 96
uspcom count 11014 0.26 1.76 0 96
publication count 11014 0.97 3.67 0 96
hrsworked continuous 11014 45.42 6.63 35 96
Motives Imp. intellectual challenge 4 point 11014 3.64 0.53 1 4
Imp.  benefits 4 point 11014 3.58 0.55 1 4
Imp.  salary 4 point 11014 3.56 0.53 1 4
Imp.  job security 4 point 11014 3.52 0.59 1 4
Imp.  independence 4 point 11014 3.48 0.59 1 4
Imp.  opportunities advancement 4 point 11014 3.35 0.65 1 4
Imp.  responsibility 4 point 11014 3.28 0.63 1 4
Imp.  contribution to society 4 point 11014 3.11 0.73 1 4
Firm level  emsize1 dummy 11014 0.03 0.17 0 1
indep. vars. emsize2 dummy 11014 0.03 0.18 0 1
emsize3 dummy 11014 0.09 0.28 0 1
emsize4 dummy 11014 0.11 0.31 0 1
emsize5 dummy 11014 0.05 0.22 0 1
emsize6 dummy 11014 0.13 0.34 0 1
emsize7 dummy 11014 0.17 0.38 0 1
emsize8 dummy 11014 0.38 0.48 0 1
newbus dummy 11014 0.08 0.28 0 1
Individual level  basic R&D dummy 11014 0.03 0.18 0 1
indep. vars applied R&D dummy 11014 0.20 0.40 0 1
development dummy 11014 0.24 0.43 0 1
design dummy 11014 0.19 0.39 0 1
computer apps dummy 11014 0.33 0.47 0 1
wa_nonrd count 11014 1.54 1.47 0 8
jobdegree 3 point 11014 2.53 0.66 1 3
hd_bachelor dummy 11014 0.45 0.50 0 1
hd_master dummy 11014 0.24 0.43 0 1
hd_phd dummy 11014 0.31 0.46 0 1
male dummy 11014 0.80 0.40 0 1
married dummy 11014 0.75 0.43 0 1
children011 count 11014 0.66 0.97 0 9
hdtenure continuous 11014 13.27 9.55 supp.* 49
supervdirect continuous 11014 1.70 4.90 supp.* 250
ln_supdir continuous 11014 0.55 0.80 supp.* 5.53
govt_nasa dummy 11014 0.03 0.16 0 1
govt_dod dummy 11014 0.12 0.33 0 1
uscitizen dummy 11014 0.85 0.36 0 1
asian dummy 11014 0.24 0.43 0 1
black dummy 11014 0.05 0.21 0 1
white dummy 11014 0.71 0.45 0 1
race_other dummy 11014 0.06 0.24 0 1
ability continuous 2805 3.42 0.77 0.42 4.75
salary continuous 11014 83951 37272 supp.* 999996
ln_salary continuous 11014 11.25 0.50 6.91 13.82
satisfaction salary 4 point 11014 3.22 0.69 1 4
Source: Based on NSF (2003): SESTAT restricted-use data file
Note: * Suppressed due to NSF confidentiality restrictions 
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Imp. Salary -0.409* -0.481**
[0.186] [0.185]
Imp. Benefits -0.154 -0.138
[0.185] [0.184]
Imp. Job Security -0.283 -0.214
[0.158] [0.156]
Imp. Challenge 0.964** 0.874**
[0.180] [0.179]
Imp. Independence 0.339* 0.293
[0.156] [0.154]
Imp. Advancement 0.017 0.060
[0.152] [0.150]
Imp. Responsibility 0.626** 0.584**
[0.158] [0.157]




EMSIZE: 1-10 -0.123 -0.345 0.069
[0.552] [0.546] [0.546]
EMSIZE: 11-24 -1.423** -1.544** -1.208*
[0.500] [0.495] [0.494]
EMSIZE: 25-99 -0.362 -0.483 -0.279
[0.338] [0.336] [0.334]
EMSIZE: 100-499 -0.427 -0.449 -0.261
[0.292] [0.290] [0.289]
EMSIZE: 500-999 -0.856* -0.848* -0.700
[0.367] [0.362] [0.359]
EMSIZE: 1000-4999 -0.640* -0.644* -0.547*
[0.261] [0.258] [0.256]
EMSIZE: 5000-24999 -0.426 -0.406 -0.338
[0.232] [0.230] [0.229]
NEWBUS 2.243** 2.204** 2.035**
[0.334] [0.330] [0.327]
IND_NAICS (27) incl. incl. incl.
WAPRI: basic -0.502 -0.538 -0.430
[0.483] [0.477] [0.474]
WAPRI: applied 0.008 -0.027 -0.042
[0.257] [0.255] [0.253]
WAPRI: design -0.066 0.000 0.023
[0.247] [0.245] [0.242]
WAPRI: computers -0.848** -0.745** -0.658**
[0.250] [0.248] [0.245]
WA_NONRD 0.938** 0.896** 0.884**
[0.064] [0.064] [0.063]
DEGREE: masters 0.584** 0.494* 0.217
[0.210] [0.208] [0.210]
DEGREE: phd 2.313** 2.041** 1.519**
[0.245] [0.244] [0.253]
HD_FIELD (15) incl. incl. incl.
LN_SUPDIR 1.662** 1.587** 1.438**
[0.114] [0.114] [0.114]
HDTENURE 0.096** 0.106** 0.042
[0.029] [0.029] [0.030]
HDTENURE_SQ -0.002** -0.002** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
JOBDEGREE 0.467** 0.423** 0.350**
[0.137] [0.136] [0.134]
MALE 0.920** 0.956** 0.802**
[0.221] [0.220] [0.218]
CHILDREN011 -1.159** -1.097** -1.098**
[0.249] [0.245] [0.247]
MALE x CHILDREN011 1.143** 1.099** 1.076**
[0.261] [0.257] [0.259]
MARRIED -0.183 -0.092 -0.113
[0.213] [0.211] [0.209]
USCITIZEN 0.630* 0.724** 0.692*
[0.278] [0.276] [0.274]
RACE (3) incl. incl. incl.
Observations 11014 11014 11014
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
30   
Table 3: Performance Regressions 
 
Basic/Appl.Developm.
zinb zinb (logit) zinb zinb zinb zinb nbreg nbreg
1a 1b 2 3 4 5 6 7
uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp
Imp. Salary 0.167* 0.175** 0.158* 0.294** 0.007
[0.065] [0.064] [0.064] [0.099] [0.092]
Imp. Benefits -0.042 -0.041 -0.029 -0.110 -0.027
[0.071] [0.071] [0.070] [0.102] [0.091]
Imp. Job Security -0.213** -0.200** -0.202** -0.332** -0.186*
[0.059] [0.060] [0.059] [0.087] [0.085]
Imp. Challenge 0.342** 0.325** 0.308** 0.452** 0.177
[0.066] [0.065] [0.066] [0.100] [0.109]
Imp. Independence 0.174** 0.184** 0.178** 0.127 0.251**
[0.054] [0.053] [0.054] [0.076] [0.088]
Imp. Advancement -0.035 -0.039 -0.041 0.111 -0.047
[0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.079] [0.089]
Imp. Responsibility -0.075 -0.085 -0.079 -0.197* -0.055
[0.054] [0.055] [0.054] [0.081] [0.091]
Imp. Contr. Society -0.034 -0.037 -0.031 -0.002 -0.043
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.064] [0.078]
HRSWORKED 0.018** 0.015** 0.013** 0.009 0.023**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]
LN_SALARY 0.277**
[0.058]
EMSIZE: 1-10 0.109 0.773* 0.093 0.164 0.149 0.114 -0.582 -0.209
[0.277] [0.385] [0.280] [0.285] [0.288] [0.285] [0.320] [0.334]
EMSIZE: 11-24 -0.208 0.575 -0.189 -0.202 -0.188 -0.222 -0.898** 0.044
[0.237] [0.358] [0.228] [0.250] [0.238] [0.236] [0.277] [0.297]
EMSIZE: 25-99 -0.082 0.770** -0.134 -0.115 -0.152 -0.201 -0.823** -0.344
[0.159] [0.252] [0.152] [0.159] [0.153] [0.151] [0.160] [0.200]
EMSIZE: 100-499 -0.332 0.536* -0.285 -0.327 -0.281 -0.261 -0.520** -0.462*
[0.187] [0.261] [0.186] [0.184] [0.184] [0.187] [0.164] [0.191]
EMSIZE: 500-999 -0.223 0.484 -0.276 -0.237 -0.288 -0.288 -0.841** -0.213
[0.192] [0.321] [0.197] [0.183] [0.187] [0.190] [0.251] [0.208]
EMSIZE: 1000-4999 -0.321** -0.05 -0.289** -0.316** -0.286** -0.279** -0.350* -0.214
[0.106] [0.213] [0.106] [0.106] [0.107] [0.106] [0.143] [0.141]
EMSIZE: 5000-24999 -0.231* 0.11 -0.223* -0.207 -0.201 -0.186 -0.573** -0.290*
[0.106] [0.187] [0.103] [0.108] [0.105] [0.104] [0.114] [0.122]
NEWBUS 0.023 -0.711* -0.054 -0.023 -0.082 -0.026 0.020 0.364*
[0.166] [0.297] [0.156] [0.165] [0.158] [0.163] [0.160] [0.173]
IND_NAICS incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
WAPRI: basic 0.295 0.786* 0.284 0.314* 0.299 0.292
[0.159] [0.312] [0.155] [0.159] [0.154] [0.153]
WAPRI: applied 0.273** -0.043 0.235** 0.272** 0.234** 0.229* 0.197
[0.094] [0.208] [0.090] [0.094] [0.090] [0.090] [0.124]
WAPRI: design -0.107 0.605** -0.101 -0.109 -0.101 -0.084
[0.126] [0.180] [0.126] [0.128] [0.128] [0.129]
WAPRI: computers -0.765** 1.149** -0.793** -0.752** -0.779** -0.742**
[0.179] [0.225] [0.173] [0.179] [0.173] [0.178]
WA_NONRD -0.009 0.041 -0.003 -0.028 -0.018 -0.022 -0.075* -0.016
[0.029] [0.041] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.036] [0.034]
DEGREE: masters 0.249 -0.466** 0.212 0.256* 0.216 0.204 0.513** 0.443**
[0.129] [0.155] [0.130] [0.129] [0.129] [0.129] [0.167] [0.139]
DEGREE: phd 0.875** -2.030** 0.815** 0.855** 0.799** 0.761** 1.424** 1.581**
[0.122] [0.226] [0.122] [0.123] [0.121] [0.123] [0.138] [0.128]
HD_FIELD incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
LN_SUPDIR 0.291** 0.300** 0.263** 0.276** 0.261** 0.383** 0.184**
[0.040] [0.039] [0.041] [0.040] [0.039] [0.063] [0.059]
HDTENURE -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.021 0.009 -0.005
[0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.018] [0.018]
HDTENURE_SQ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
JOBDEGREE 0.136* 0.142* 0.141* 0.144* 0.144* -0.029 0.187*
[0.060] [0.057] [0.059] [0.057] [0.057] [0.084] [0.080]
MALE 0.595** 0.588** 0.581** 0.577** 0.556** 0.394** 0.564**
[0.088] [0.085] [0.088] [0.086] [0.085] [0.114] [0.133]
USCITIZEN 0.150 0.163* 0.140 0.156 0.137 -0.093 -0.037
[0.084] [0.082] [0.085] [0.082] [0.082] [0.129] [0.130]





Observations 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014 2586 2690
Chi-square 459.162 526.916 462.118 527.585 531.322 943.516 600.498
df 66 74 67 75 76 72 71
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Full Sample 
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APPENDIX 
Motives: Additional Descriptive Analyses 
Table 1 above provides summary statistics for the preference measures, ordered from 
highest to lowest average importance. Note that the means for all preference measures are above 
three, indicating a high to very high importance of all factors. Respondents rated intellectual 
challenge as the most important work benefit, followed by fringe benefits, salary, job security, 
independence, opportunities for advancement, responsibility, and contribution to society.  
An interesting question is whether the motives and preferences for job characteristics 
vary across type of work (e.g., basic research vs. development), type of field, or degree. We 
would expect such differences if different work settings and tasks offer different kinds of work 
benefits and if individuals self-select based on their motives and preferences. To examine such 
differences, we regressed the eight preference measures on three sets of dummy variables: 
primary type of work (basic research is the omitted category), type of degree (Bachelors is the 
omitted category), and field of highest degree (engineering fields is the omitted category).
 1 The 
results of these regressions (estimated using ordered probit) are shown in Table A3. All 
regressions are highly significant, suggesting that there are significant differences in individuals’ 
preferences across degrees, fields, and types of work. With respect to differences across types of 
degrees, we find that PhDs report a significantly lower importance of extrinsic benefits (salary 
and fringe benefits) as well as job security than Bachelors, while reporting higher importance of 
certain intrinsic benefits (challenge, contribution to society, and independence).  
                                                       
1 Please refer to the measurement section for a list of all fields. For this analysis, we formed three 
aggregate classes of fields: engineering (omitted), science, and other fields.   
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Comparisons of individuals’ preference across primary types of work show significant 
differences with respect to some factors but not others (development is the omitted category). 
We find no differences with respect to preferences for salary, and only small differences with 
respect to preferences for fringe benefits. Individuals primarily engaged in design and computer 
applications report significantly lower importance of intellectual challenge, independence, 
opportunities for advancement, responsibility, and contribution to society than individuals in 
development. Individuals in basic and applied research report a higher importance of intellectual 
challenge and contribution to society than those in development.
2  
A comparison of the motives of individuals with science versus engineering degrees 
shows only small differences (controlling for the primary type of work). Scientists have 
somewhat stronger preferences for fringe benefits, independence and job security. 
Finally, we examined the relationships among the preference measures. An exploratory 
factor analysis (common factor analysis, oblique rotation with oblimin(0) criterion) revealed two 
factors, as shown in Table A4. The preferences for responsibility, intellectual challenge, 
independence, contribution to society, and advancement load on one factor. The preferences for 
fringe benefits, salary, as well as job security load on a second factor. It is interesting to note that 
the preference for opportunities for advancement does not load on the same factor as salary and 
fringe benefits, indicating that the preference for opportunities for advancement may not 
strictly—or even primarily—reflect a pecuniary motive. Overall, the results of this factor 
analysis suggest that individuals’ preferences are correlated in systematic ways. While some 
                                                       
2 In interpreting these results, we have to consider the potential for social desirability bias. For example, 
PhDs could think that they are expected to care more than non- PhDs about intellectual challenge and 
contribution to society, and their higher importance ratings could reflect an attempt to conform to these 
expectations.  
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individuals emphasize extrinsic benefits such as salary and fringe benefits as well as job security, 
others emphasize intrinsic benefits. However, the correlation between the two extracted factors is 
positive (r=0.23), suggesting that intrinsic and extrinsic motives are not two opposite ends of a 
“motivation continuum” but two motivational orientations that can occur within the same 
individual (see also Amabile et al., 1994).  
In some disciplines, it is common to use factor-based scores derived from a factor 
analysis as new variables in subsequent regression analyses. This method assumes that the 
component measures capture the same underlying latent construct (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 
1991). We do not make such an assumption and focus on the individual preference measures.  
 
Effort: Additional Analyses 
The distributional characteristics of our effort measure (number of hours worked) suggest 
robustness checks using alternative estimation techniques. First, a large number of respondents 
(39.8%) reported HRSWORKED of 40 hours per week, while only very few individuals report 
less than 40 hours. It is conceivable that some of the individuals reporting 40 hours actually work 
less, but report 40 hours since this is the official work time in many organizations. In this case, 
40 hours could be considered the lower limit of a censored distribution. To address this 
possibility, we estimate key effort models using a Tobit regression model, with a lower limit of 
40 hours. Second, many responses are clustered at “round” values such as 40 and 50 hours. To 
address this issue, we divided the HRSWORKED measure into categories, each spanning 5 
hours. Using the resulting measure HRSCAT5 as our new dependent variable, we also estimated 
effort regressions using ordered probit. The Tobit and ordered probit regression suggests that the  
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effects of the importance of challenge, responsibility, and salary are robust. However, the effects 
of the preference for contribution to society and independence appear to be fragile.  
We also estimated key effort regressions without individuals who are employed in 
computer systems design, which is the largest single industry in our sample (for an industry 
breakdown, see Table A1), as well as on the subsample of individuals employed in 
manufacturing industries. The qualitative results are similar to our benchmark regressions (Table 
2), with slight changes of the coefficients of the importance of salary and job security. 
Finally, we estimated key regressions using the sample of PhDs, for which we have 
additional measures. First, we constructed a measure of ability based on the ratings of the quality 
of the respondent’s graduate department. Second, we obtained firm identifiers to control for firm 
fixed effects. In Table A6, we examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion of these two 
sets of measures. Model 1 reproduces the results from the full sample (Table 2, model 2). Model 
2 is estimated using only non-PhDs. Model 3 estimates the base line model using the PhD-
sample. Comparing models 2 and 3, we observe several differences in the effects of motives on 
effort. More specifically, the negative coefficient of the salary motive is confined to the non- 
PhD sample, while the coefficient is positive (but insignificant) in the PhD sample. The negative 
effect of the importance of job security as well as the positive effect of the importance of 
challenge is larger for the PhDs.
 3 In model 4, we include the ABILITY measure. Consistent with 
our model, the coefficient is positive and highly significant, suggesting that individuals who 
graduated from higher-ranked PhD programs expend more effort. Including this ABILITY 
                                                       
3 A detailed analysis of differences in the effects of motives across degree types using interactions shows 
three significant effects: For individuals with a Masters degree, the preference for contribution to society 
has a stronger positive effect than for individuals with a Bachelors degree. For PhDs, the effect on effort 
of the importance of salary is more positive, and the importance of job security is more negative than for 
individuals with a bachelor's degree.  
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measure does not significantly change the coefficients of the eight preference measures. Finally, 
in model 5, we also include one dummy variable for each firm that has 5 or more individuals in 
our sample. Their inclusion has little impact on the coefficients of our key independent variables. 
Overall, the results of these analyses using the PhD-sample suggest that including firm identifiers 
and a better measure of ability in effort regressions does not substantially affect the estimated 
coefficients of individuals’ motives and preferences. 
 
Performance: Additional Analyses 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we re-estimated key performance 
regressions using negative binomial regression (NBREG) and using different subsets of our 
sample (Table A7). Models 1 and 2 are equivalent to the ZINB models 2 and 4 in Table 3 and are 
estimated using the full sample. While the positive effect of effort remains strong and significant, 
the estimated effect of the importance of salary is insignificant, and the effect of the importance 
of independence is reduced. The effect of the preference for intellectual challenge, however, is 
even stronger than in the ZINB models. In model 7, we estimate a negative binomial model using 
only those cases that have at least one patent application (N=2,637). This regression thus 
examines the impact of effort and individuals’ preferences for individuals who were productive 
enough to have at least one patent application and who were not precluded from patenting (who 
are not in the “never patent” group predicted by the logit part of the ZINB model). Compared to 
the reference model (model 2), the effect of effort is reduced. The effect of the importance of 
salary as well as independence increases. The effect of the importance of challenge is reduced  
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but remains highly significant. The effect of the importance of job security becomes 
insignificant.
4  
We also estimated performance regressions using only cases from the pharmaceutical and 
medical device industries (model 8). While the number of cases in this subsample is relatively 
small (N=769), this analysis is particularly interesting because patents are very effective in these 
industries and should more closely reflect innovative performance than in other industries 
(Cohen et al., 2000). Compared to the estimates from the full sample (model 2), we find that the 
effect of effort becomes insignificant, while the effects of the importance of challenge, job 
security, and independence increase. 
 
Analyses Employing the PhD Sample 
Our PhD-sample, for which we have better measures of individuals’ ability as well as 
firm identifiers, allows us to examine the robustness of our results to two potentially problematic 
issues. First, the relationship we observe between certain motives and performance may have 
ability as a common cause. Individuals with greater ability or better training could enjoy 
intellectual challenge, for example, because they are capable of meeting those challenges.  In that 
case, the observed relationship between desire for challenge and performance would be spurious. 
To rule this out, we add an important measure of ability and training.     
                                                       
4 We conducted additional analyses to probe the robustness of our results. First, there are a small number 
of cases in our sample with a very high number of reported U.S. patent applications. While these cases 
might be truly exceptional performers, it could also be that a very high count of USPAPP reflects 
measurement error (e.g., individuals reported lifetime patents) or cases where individuals are named on 
patents without having directly contributed to the invention. Given the small mean of USPAPP in our 
sample, such cases could severely impact our estimation results. To assess any such effect, we dropped all 
respondents reporting more than 20 U.S. patent applications in a 5-year span (77 cases, 0.7% of the full 
sample). The effect of HRSWORKED is unchanged compared to the reference model. However, the 
effect of the importance of salary becomes insignificant. The effect of the preference for challenge 
remains large and highly significant.  
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Second, our analysis thus far could have failed to control sufficiently for firm 
characteristics, and there are any number of reasons to expect the impact of motives to be at least 
partly conditioned by firm effects. Among others, it is conceivable that certain firms command 
higher levels of resources and also attract individuals with particular sets of motives. 
Alternatively, firms may have different policies linking performance, for example, to financial 
rewards, implying an impact of firm effects if there is indeed a correlation between the 
preference for a given type of benefits and the degree to which that benefit is contingent upon 
effort or performance within a firm.
5  
Table A8 reports the results of a set of negative binomial regressions using the PhD-
sample. Model 1 reproduces the results from model 1 in Table A7 (regression using the full 
sample), while model 2 estimates the model using only the PhD sample. Comparing the two 
regressions, we observe that the importance of salary and the importance of independence appear 
to have a somewhat stronger positive effect in this PhD-sample, while the importance of job 
security and intellectual challenge have a somewhat smaller effect.
6 In model 3, we add our 
measure of ability (quality of graduate department). This measures has a significant and 
economically meaningful positive effect (a one-SD higher ability score translates into a 9.1% 
higher expected patent count), but its addition to the model has virtually no effect on the 
preference measures. In model 6, we additionally include our effort measure (HRSWORKED) as 
well as the interaction between ABILITY and HRSWORKED. As predicted, the interaction term 
                                                       
5 Also, firms may differ in their propensity to patent, i.e., in the likelihood that a given invention is 
actually patented. While it is not clear that the latter effect would systematically affect our estimates of 
the impact of motives on performance, controlling for such effects is certainly desirable.  
6 Regressions examining these differences using interaction terms show that the effect of the preference 
for contribution to society is significantly smaller for PhDs than for Bachelors (negative interaction), 
while the effects of the importance of independence are significantly larger (positive interaction).  
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is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the productivity of innovative effort increases with 
the ability of the individual. In model 7, we add a dummy variable for every firm that has 5 or 
more individuals in our sample. The firm effects are jointly significant and their inclusion also 
changes the coefficients of some preference measures. More specifically, the coefficients of 
importance of salary, importance of challenge, and importance of independence are somewhat 
reduced. Once the firm fixed effects are included, the main effects of effort and ability are 
insignificant, but the interaction term is highly significant. 
Overall, our analyses using the PhD-sample show that, first, ability and effort affect 
performance interactively, as suggested by our formal model. Second, the effects of individuals’ 
motives and preferences for job characteristics are largely independent of ability, ruling out an 
important alternative explanation for our results. Third, the significant impacts of individuals’ 
motives and preferences for job characteristics persist even with controls for firm fixed effects. 
At the same time, however, the coefficients of some preference measures change once we control 
for firm effects, suggesting that firms may differ with respect to the motives and preferences of 
their employees, which in turn could impact firms’ relative innovative performance. We examine 
this interplay between individual and firm-level effects in more detail in related work 
(Sauermann et al., 2007). 
 
Alternative Performance Measures 
Finally, in addition to using U.S. patent applications, we also estimated performance 
regressions using alternative measures of innovative performance (Table A9). The most 
important alternative measure is the number of patents granted over a 5-year span that were 
licensed or commercialized (USPCOM). The virtue of this measure is that it provides a rough  
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sense of the number of economically important inventions that were patented, thus providing a 
crude quality threshold for our performance measure, as opposed to the number of patent 
applications or patents granted, the majority of which are not economically important. As noted 
above, one reason that we do not feature this measure is that strategic considerations other than 
value may condition the firm’s decision to commercialize an invention. Second, the 
commercialization introduces a substantial and highly variable time lag between the R&D 
activity and the observed outcome. Notwithstanding these latter concerns, a number of our 
results are robust. First, our measure of effort, HRSWORKED, continues to have a positive, 
significant coefficient. The qualitative results for our featured independent variables also remain 
robust. Preference for intellectual challenge importantly affects performance. The preference for 
salary remains positive but is no longer significant. Finally, the effect of the preference for job 
security remains negative and significant. 
Table A9 also shows the results of regressions using peer reviewed publications as 
dependent variables. The results of models 7 and 8 suggest that effort has a strong positive 
impact on publication output and that the importance of intellectual challenge continues to have a 
significant and large positive effect. Interestingly, the importance of job security and the 
importance of independence do not have significant effects. This analysis is purely exploratory 
since publications are likely to measure a different kind of innovative performance than patents 
do, and many firms may have policies that discourage the publication of research findings. More 
work is needed to understand the drivers of patenting and publishing in industry, and it would be 
particularly interesting to examine similarities and differences with academic settings.  
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Appendix: Tables 
 
Table A1: Sample Composition 
 
 
Table A2: Comparison of Full Sample and PhD-Sample 
 
Industry (IND_NAICS) Basic Applied Develop- Design Computer
Research Research ment Apps.
21x Mining,Oil,Gas ≤5* 57 49 33 36
22x Utilities 8 37 31 107 91
23x Construction ≤5* 17 15 74 28
311-312 Manufacturing:Food,Bev,Tobacco 8 51 47 26 30
313-316 Manufacturing:Textiles ≤5* 7 16 ≤5* 14
3211,337 Manufacturing:Wood,Furniture ≤5* ≤5* 10 ≤20* 13
322-323 Manufacturing:Paper,Printing ≤5* 23 32 20 34
324 Manufacturing:Petroleum ≤5* 21 10 22 20
325 Manufacturing:Chemicals ex Pharma 21 206 213 76 55
3254 Pharma 49 239 152 27 71
326 Manufacturing:Plastics,Rubber ≤5* 19 33 27 16
327 Manufacturing:NonmetalMinerals ≤5* 7 23 21 11
331 Manufacturing:PrimaryMetal ≤5* 7 17 26 16
332 Manufacturing:FabricatedMetal ≤5* 10 50 60 19
333 Manufacturing:Machinery ≤5* 43 106 159 101
3341 Manufacturing:Computers 8 51 144 67 156
3342-3343 Manufacturing:Communications,Audio, Video ≤5* 40 89 79 107
3344 Manufacturing:Semiconductors,Electronics 11 90 327 190 263
3345 Manufacturing:Instruments ≤5* 39 96 102 105
335 Manufacturing:HouseholdAppliances,Lighting ≤5* 24 60 41 43
3361-3363 Manufacturing:Auto 8 54 129 140 80
3364 Manufacturing:Aircraft,Aerospace 9 94 210 284 202
3365-3369 Manufacturing:TransportationEquipment ≤5* ≤5* 17 25 18
3391 Manufacturing:MedicalEquipment 6 50 91 50 34
3399 Manufacturing:Misc. ≤5* 5 23 21 23
517 Telecom Services 16 54 83 103 282
5415 Computer Systems Design 38 145 306 205 1,645
5417 Scientific R&D Services 160 805 311 84 136
Total 381 2,205 2,690 2,089 3,649
Source: Based on NSF (2003): SESTAT restricted-use data file
*Counts suppressed due to NSF confidentiality restrictions
Primary work activity (WAPRI) Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Basic research 381 3.46 116 4.14
Applied research 2,205 20.02 1,092 38.93
Development 2,690 24.42 933 33.26
Design 2,089 18.97 261 9.3
Computer Apps./Programming 3,649 33.13 403 14.37
Total 11,014 100 2805 100
DEGREE
Bachelor 4,977 45.19 0 0
Master 2,666 24.21 0 0
PhD 3,371 30.61 2805 100
Total 11,014 100 2805 100
Source: Based on NSF (2003): SESTAT restricted-use data file
Full Sample Ph.D.-Sample 
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Table A3: Differences in Preference Ratings 
 
 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit
IMP_SAL IMP_BEN IMP_SEC IMP_CHAL IMP_IND IMP_ADV IMP_RESP IMP_SOC
Basic Research -0.038 0.115 0.182** 0.149* 0.069 0.180** 0.098 0.248**
[0.068] [0.071] [0.069] [0.074] [0.065] [0.063] [0.065] [0.066]
Applied Research 0.012 0.096** 0.032 0.133** 0.089* 0.023 0.015 0.112**
[0.036] [0.035] [0.035] [0.039] [0.036] [0.034] [0.034] [0.033]
Design -0.045 0.002 -0.023 -0.098** -0.111** -0.195** -0.131** -0.102**
[0.037] [0.037] [0.036] [0.038] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034]
Computer Apps. 0.001 -0.068* -0.059 -0.120** -0.112** -0.174** -0.220** -0.160**
[0.033] [0.033] [0.032] [0.033] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.029]
Masters -0.029 -0.118** -0.141** 0.080** 0.02 0.05 0.081** 0.118**
[0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027]
PhD -0.311** -0.408** -0.362** 0.230** 0.094** -0.011 0.058* 0.243**
[0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.032] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028]
Field: Science 0.015 0.059* 0.043 0.026 0.055* -0.047 -0.043 0.054*
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025]
Field: Other 0.054 0.118** 0.035 -0.024 0.125** -0.079* -0.009 0.009
[0.037] [0.037] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
Observations 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014
Chi-square 144.792 209.691 165.321 192.998 99.981 97.677 113.875 313.853
df 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors in brackets
Source: Based on NSF (2003): SESTAT restricted-use data file
Preference measure Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
Importance responsibility 0.69 0.02 0.51
Importance intellectual challenge 0.62 -0.08 0.64
Importance independence 0.57 -0.04 0.68
Importance contribution society 0.51 -0.01 0.75
Importance opportunities advancement 0.49 0.21 0.67
Importance benefits 0.01 0.68 0.54
Importance salary -0.04 0.61 0.63
Importance job security 0.04 0.51 0.73









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 USPAPP 1
2 USPGRT 0.7958* 1
3 USPCOM 0.5951* 0.7831* 1
4 HRSWORKED 0.1039* 0.0713* 0.0517* 1
5 IMP_SAL -0.0206 -0.0308* -0.0126 -0.0444* 1
6 IMP_BEN -0.0380* -0.0397* -0.023 -0.0339* 0.4990* 1
7 IMP_SEC -0.0553* -0.0388* -0.0345* -0.0549* 0.2879* 0.4206* 1
8 IMP_CHAL 0.0682* 0.0489* 0.0322* 0.1151* -0.0005 0.0600* 0.0334* 1
9 IMP_IND 0.0491* 0.0398* 0.0229 0.0828* 0.0357* 0.0875* 0.0593* 0.3768* 1
10 IMP_ADV 0.0187 -0.0086 -0.0074 0.0447* 0.2006* 0.2004* 0.2052* 0.3336* 0.2278* 1
11 IMP_RESP 0.0282* 0.0117 0.0104 0.1060* 0.1039* 0.1098* 0.1026* 0.4342* 0.4391* 0.4506* 1
12 IMP_SOC 0.0285* 0.0106 -0.0019 0.0466* -0.0139 0.0987* 0.1143* 0.3173* 0.3064* 0.2668* 0.3550* 1
13 EMSIZE1 -0.0010 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0425* -0.0388* -0.0810* -0.0731* 0.0172 0.0296* -0.0133 0.0074 0.0001 1
14 EMSIZE8 0.0350* 0.0272* 0.0056 0.0015 0.0101 0.0494* 0.0415* -0.0007 -0.0079 -0.0084 -0.0051 0.0086 -0.1389* 1
15 NEWBUS 0.0148 -0.0084 -0.0042 0.0795* -0.0319* -0.0640* -0.0926* 0.0211 0.0062 0.0328* 0.0140 0.0022 0.2458* -0.1935* 1
16 WAPRI: basic 0.0107 0.0094 -0.0125 -0.0090 -0.0084 0.0119 0.0258* 0.0273* 0.0197 0.0403* 0.0293* 0.0499* 0.0093 -0.0315* 0.0064
17 WAPRI: applied 0.1488* 0.1070* 0.0422* 0.0609* -0.0286* -0.0033 -0.0178 0.0838* 0.0642* 0.0405* 0.0470* 0.0984* 0.0078 0.0201 0.0147
18 WAPRI: develop. 0.0610* 0.0590* 0.0655* 0.0566* -0.0118 -0.0218 -0.0128 0.0244 0.0192 0.0427* 0.0481* 0.0334* -0.0159 0.0122 0.0106
19 WAPRI: design -0.0445* -0.0280* -0.0120 -0.0090 0.0016 0.0188 0.0117 -0.0416* -0.0406* -0.0399* -0.0155 -0.0478* -0.0368* 0.0023 -0.0628*
20 WAPRI: comp. apps -0.1492* -0.1251* -0.0808* -0.0925* 0.0370* 0.0024 0.0070 -0.0695* -0.0459* -0.0558* -0.0824* -0.0937* 0.0350* -0.0179 0.0277*
21 WA_NONRD 0.0162 0.0273* 0.0262* 0.2223* 0.0216 0.0349* 0.0126 0.0506* 0.0695* 0.1114* 0.1390* 0.0772* 0.0468* -0.0606* 0.0126
22 JOBDEGREE 0.0337* 0.0209 0.0207 0.0346* 0.0321* 0.0323* 0.0404* 0.0569* 0.0337* 0.0687* 0.0718* 0.0691* 0.0147 0.0053 -0.0122
23 HD: bachelor -0.1712* -0.1349* -0.0758* -0.0852* 0.0736* 0.0998* 0.0985* -0.0855* -0.0442* -0.0274* -0.0488* -0.1127* -0.0091 -0.0501* -0.0465*
24 HD: master -0.0773* -0.0596* -0.0256* -0.0337* 0.0347* 0.0150 -0.0002 -0.0107 -0.0115 0.0112 0.0137 -0.0033 -0.0114 0.0311* 0.0006
25 HD: PHD 0.2568* 0.2010* 0.1056* 0.1234* -0.1117* -0.1217* -0.1062* 0.1023* 0.0584* 0.0192 0.0400* 0.1248* 0.0204 0.0252* 0.0497*
26 HDTENURE 0.0208 0.0656* 0.0465* 0.0283* -0.0530* -0.0120 -0.0382* -0.0592* 0.0160 -0.2777* -0.0949* -0.0237 0.018 0.008 -0.0697*
27 LN_SUPDIR 0.1149* 0.0994* 0.0770* 0.2517* -0.0151 -0.0014 -0.0361* 0.0742* 0.0511* 0.0699* 0.1156* 0.0759* 0.0155 -0.0195 0.0069
28 LN_SALARY 0.1469* 0.1360* 0.0919* 0.1695* -0.0085 -0.0379* -0.0830* 0.0566* 0.0487* -0.0802* 0.0175 -0.0164 -0.0288* 0.0844* 0.0129
29 Satisfaction Salary 0.0177 0.0110 0.0008 0.0082 -0.0019 0.0369* 0.0347* 0.0758* 0.0593* -0.0693* 0.0346* 0.0350* -0.0217 0.0757* -0.0297*
30 ABILITY 0.0589* 0.0293 -0.0090 0.0726* -0.0507* -0.0455 -0.0759* 0.0340 -0.0318 -0.0396 -0.0442 -0.0581* -0.0510* -0.0144 0.0199
31 MALE 0.0644* 0.0601* 0.0437* 0.0653* -0.0143 -0.0519* -0.0590* -0.0221 -0.0459* -0.0510* -0.0399* -0.0852* 0.0359* -0.0372* 0.0231
32 MARRIED 0.0451* 0.0434* 0.0277* 0.0165 0.0203 0.0470* 0.0264* -0.0368* -0.0206 -0.0439* -0.0121 0.0156 -0.0185 -0.0027 -0.0314*
33 CHILDREN011 0.0325* 0.0269* 0.0220 0.0056 0.0410* 0.0501* 0.0255* -0.0171 -0.0176 0.0258* 0.0021 0.0160 -0.0059 -0.0174 0.0165





16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
16 WAPRI: basic 1
17 WAPRI: applied -0.0947* 1
18 WAPRI: develop. -0.1076* -0.2844* 1
19 WAPRI: design -0.0916* -0.2421* -0.2750* 1
20 WAPRI: comp. apps -0.1332* -0.3522* -0.4001* -0.3405* 1
21 WA_NONRD -0.007 0.0389* 0.0629* 0.0385* -0.1199* 1
22 JOBDEGREE 0.0247* 0.0825* 0.0537* 0.0288* -0.1528* 0.0104 1
23 HD: bachelor -0.0181 -0.2172* -0.1068* 0.1396* 0.1729* 0.0578* -0.0124 1
24 HD: master -0.0177 -0.0963* -0.0055 0.0126 0.0832* -0.0129 0.0744* -0.5131* 1
25 HD: PHD 0.0360* 0.3240* 0.1205* -0.1625* -0.2640* -0.0505* -0.0558* -0.6030* -0.3753* 1
26 HDTENURE -0.0297* -0.0219 -0.0039 0.0530* -0.0104 0.0133 -0.1052* 0.0870* -0.0715* -0.0276* 1
27 LN_SUPDIR -0.0058 0.0817* 0.0564* 0.0091 -0.1263* 0.3966* 0.0504* -0.0962* -0.0352* 0.1366* 0.0836* 1
28 LN_SALARY -0.0412* 0.0540* 0.0477* -0.0277* -0.0504* 0.0287* 0.0403* -0.2017* 0.0326* 0.1875* 0.2613* 0.1927* 1
29 Satisfaction Salary -0.0077 0.0340* -0.0064 -0.0202 -0.0032 -0.023 0.0403* 0.0033 -0.011 0.0067 0.0650* 0.0520* 0.1925* 1
30 ABILITY 0.0172 0.0413 0.0041 -0.0231 -0.0536* -0.0227 -0.0453 . . . 0.0328 -0.0139 0.0849* 0.0540* 1
31 MALE -0.0495* -0.0530* 0.0329* 0.0663* -0.021 0.0063 0.0269* -0.0077 -0.0297* 0.0359* 0.1294* 0.0723* 0.1382* -0.021 -0.0215 1
32 MARRIED -0.0368* 0.016 0.0202 -0.0013 -0.0168 0.0225 0.0217 -0.1086* 0.0330* 0.0866* 0.1944* 0.0836* 0.1279* 0.0225 -0.0675* 0.1260* 1
33 CHILDREN011 -0.0081 -0.019 0.0131 -0.0105 0.016 0.0241 0.0154 -0.0338* -0.0022 0.0386* -0.1285* 0.0645* 0.0480* -0.0055 0.0033 0.0646* 0.3395*
* significant at 1% 
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Table A6: Effort Regressions ( PhD – Sample) 
 
Full Sample PHD=0
truncreg truncreg truncreg truncreg truncreg
1 2 3 4 5
hrsworked hrsworked hrsworked hrsworked hrsworked
Imp. Salary -0.409* -0.662** 0.400 0.408 0.569
[0.186] [0.211] [0.391] [0.389] [0.382]
Imp. Benefits -0.154 -0.227 -0.187 -0.175 -0.294
[0.185] [0.210] [0.369] [0.368] [0.360]
Imp. Job Security -0.283 -0.021 -0.688* -0.640* -0.668*
[0.158] [0.180] [0.315] [0.314] [0.300]
Imp. Challenge 0.964** 0.773** 1.546** 1.470** 1.550**
[0.180] [0.203] [0.378] [0.377] [0.366]
Imp. Independence 0.339* 0.363* 0.149 0.178 0.070
[0.156] [0.175] [0.339] [0.337] [0.323]
Imp. Advancement 0.017 0.081 0.028 0.028 0.099
[0.152] [0.169] [0.315] [0.314] [0.306]
Imp. Responsibility 0.626** 0.525** 0.566 0.593 0.450
[0.158] [0.180] [0.325] [0.323] [0.310]
Imp. Contr. Society -0.149 -0.143 0.012 0.045 0.020




EMSIZE: 1-10 -0.345 -0.618 0.237 0.445 1.940
[0.546] [0.633] [1.122] [1.121] [1.184]
EMSIZE: 11-24 -1.544** -1.931** -0.756 -0.766 0.839
[0.495] [0.583] [0.933] [0.933] [1.023]
EMSIZE: 25-99 -0.483 -0.742 0.252 0.229 1.702*
[0.336] [0.387] [0.679] [0.677] [0.819]
EMSIZE: 100-499 -0.449 -0.564 -0.616 -0.617 0.794
[0.290] [0.344] [0.576] [0.578] [0.753]
EMSIZE: 500-999 -0.848* -0.839* -0.518 -0.431 1.659
[0.362] [0.415] [0.833] [0.832] [0.948]
EMSIZE: 1000-4999 -0.644* -0.661* -0.792 -0.843 0.607
[0.258] [0.296] [0.518] [0.517] [0.670]
EMSIZE: 5000-24999 -0.406 -0.440 -0.454 -0.437 0.616
[0.230] [0.264] [0.480] [0.478] [0.540]
NEWBUS 2.204** 1.967** 2.815** 2.766** 2.664**
[0.330] [0.400] [0.634] [0.635] [0.637]
IND_NAICS (27) incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
WAPRI: basic -0.538 -1.440* 1.495 1.448 1.735
[0.477] [0.580] [0.912] [0.912] [0.901]
WAPRI: applied -0.027 0.001 0.044 0.008 -0.076
[0.255] [0.357] [0.404] [0.403] [0.388]
WAPRI: design 0.000 -0.083 -0.239 -0.193 -0.230
[0.245] [0.275] [0.590] [0.590] [0.582]
WAPRI: computers -0.745** -0.733** -0.988 -0.919 -0.900
[0.248] [0.274] [0.620] [0.615] [0.571]
WA_NONRD 0.896** 0.834** 1.006** 1.011** 1.001**
[0.064] [0.074] [0.125] [0.124] [0.122]




HD_FIELD (15) incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
LN_SUPDIR 1.587** 1.365** 1.915** 1.928** 1.924**
[0.114] [0.132] [0.229] [0.229] [0.221]
HDTENURE 0.106** 0.074* 0.180* 0.174* 0.169*
[0.029] [0.032] [0.072] [0.072] [0.070]
HDTENURE_SQ -0.002** -0.002* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
JOBDEGREE 0.423** 0.408* 0.253 0.297 0.115
[0.136] [0.162] [0.280] [0.280] [0.272]
MALE 0.956** 0.922** 0.574 0.625 0.781
[0.220] [0.241] [0.506] [0.502] [0.471]
CHILDREN011 -1.097** -0.530* -2.833** -2.875** -3.019**
[0.245] [0.255] [0.544] [0.544] [0.532]
MALE x CHILDREN011 1.099** 0.709** 2.506** 2.529** 2.634**
[0.257] [0.271] [0.572] [0.571] [0.558]
MARRIED -0.092 -0.017 -0.248 -0.151 0.014
[0.211] [0.237] [0.460] [0.457] [0.431]
USCITIZEN 0.724** 1.078** -0.153 -0.219 -0.247
[0.276] [0.350] [0.523] [0.522] [0.499]
RACE (3) incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 11014 7643 2805 2805 2805
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source: Based on NSF (2003): SESTAT restricted-use data file
Phd-Sample 
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Table A7: Performance Regressions: Auxiliary Analyses 
 
Basic/Appl.Developm. Design Compapp. uspapp>0 Pharmed
nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp
Imp. Salary 0.088 0.102 0.294** 0.007 0.169 -0.193 0.137** 0.204
[0.073] [0.072] [0.099] [0.092] [0.144] [0.165] [0.053] [0.176]
Imp. Benefits -0.022 -0.019 -0.110 -0.027 -0.065 0.238 -0.010 -0.226
[0.075] [0.074] [0.102] [0.091] [0.151] [0.156] [0.057] [0.177]
Imp. Job Security -0.268** -0.255** -0.332** -0.186* -0.460** -0.393** -0.090 -0.298*
[0.059] [0.059] [0.087] [0.085] [0.130] [0.133] [0.054] [0.145]
Imp. Challenge 0.394** 0.373** 0.452** 0.177 0.173 0.852** 0.152** 0.585**
[0.070] [0.069] [0.100] [0.109] [0.146] [0.173] [0.053] [0.190]
Imp. Independence 0.114* 0.123* 0.127 0.251** -0.087 0.106 0.167** 0.338*
[0.058] [0.057] [0.076] [0.088] [0.135] [0.147] [0.045] [0.155]
Imp. Advancement -0.041 -0.048 0.111 -0.047 -0.097 -0.018 0.012 -0.159
[0.057] [0.056] [0.079] [0.089] [0.123] [0.140] [0.045] [0.153]
Imp. Responsibility -0.071 -0.085 -0.197* -0.055 0.097 -0.214 -0.057 -0.327*
[0.058] [0.058] [0.081] [0.091] [0.131] [0.140] [0.048] [0.166]
Imp. Contr. Society 0.019 0.019 -0.002 -0.043 0.128 -0.152 -0.049 0.165
[0.049] [0.050] [0.064] [0.078] [0.097] [0.104] [0.043] [0.120]
HRSWORKED 0.019** 0.009 0.023** 0.026* 0.025* 0.009* -0.006
[0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.011] [0.011] [0.004] [0.011]
EMSIZE: 1-10 -0.321 -0.283 -0.582 -0.209 0.099 -0.451 0.031 0.493
[0.203] [0.202] [0.320] [0.334] [0.531] [0.417] [0.200] [0.499]
EMSIZE: 11-24 -0.533** -0.509* -0.898** 0.044 0.156 -1.810** -0.152 0.030
[0.197] [0.202] [0.277] [0.297] [0.402] [0.429] [0.200] [0.522]
EMSIZE: 25-99 -0.523** -0.526** -0.823** -0.344 -0.368 -0.550* -0.148 0.583
[0.124] [0.124] [0.160] [0.200] [0.274] [0.270] [0.102] [0.316]
EMSIZE: 100-499 -0.571** -0.561** -0.520** -0.462* -0.582* -1.408** -0.197 -0.370
[0.132] [0.130] [0.164] [0.191] [0.239] [0.268] [0.116] [0.283]
EMSIZE: 500-999 -0.439** -0.433** -0.841** -0.213 -0.452 -0.381 -0.193 0.006
[0.142] [0.139] [0.251] [0.208] [0.309] [0.310] [0.142] [0.353]
EMSIZE: 1000-4999 -0.269** -0.256** -0.350* -0.214 -0.154 -0.380 -0.169* 0.152
[0.092] [0.092] [0.143] [0.141] [0.202] [0.213] [0.075] [0.243]
EMSIZE: 5000-24999 -0.210* -0.191 -0.573** -0.290* 0.440* -0.134 -0.141 -0.396
[0.104] [0.105] [0.114] [0.122] [0.210] [0.238] [0.072] [0.223]
NEWBUS 0.287* 0.239 0.020 0.364* 0.395 0.572* -0.012 0.185
[0.122] [0.123] [0.160] [0.173] [0.287] [0.285] [0.102] [0.275]
IND_NAICS incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
WAPRI: basic -0.106 -0.085 0.148 0.854*
[0.139] [0.138] [0.115] [0.333]
WAPRI: applied 0.201* 0.201* 0.197 0.187** 0.609**
[0.081] [0.080] [0.124] [0.064] [0.201]
WAPRI: design -0.352** -0.346** -0.027 -0.381
[0.106] [0.106] [0.090] [0.319]
WAPRI: computers -1.300** -1.286** -0.417** -1.713**
[0.109] [0.109] [0.097] [0.349]
WA_NONRD -0.045 -0.060* -0.075* -0.016 -0.204** -0.011 0.009 -0.102
[0.024] [0.025] [0.036] [0.034] [0.059] [0.060] [0.021] [0.068]
DEGREE: masters 0.469** 0.471** 0.513** 0.443** 0.794** 0.246 0.128 0.160
[0.097] [0.097] [0.167] [0.139] [0.178] [0.167] [0.082] [0.257]
DEGREE: phd 1.580** 1.560** 1.424** 1.581** 1.912** 2.002** 0.455** 0.912**
[0.084] [0.085] [0.138] [0.128] [0.199] [0.198] [0.068] [0.234]
HD_FIELD incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
LN_SUPDIR 0.298** 0.272** 0.383** 0.184** 0.374** 0.093 0.116** 0.474**
[0.041] [0.041] [0.063] [0.059] [0.082] [0.099] [0.033] [0.126]
HDTENURE -0.006 -0.008 0.009 -0.005 0.007 -0.050 -0.036** 0.074*
[0.013] [0.013] [0.018] [0.018] [0.024] [0.028] [0.011] [0.033]
HDTENURE_SQ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001** -0.002*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
JOBDEGREE 0.215** 0.214** -0.029 0.187* 0.434** 0.391** 0.006 -0.121
[0.058] [0.057] [0.084] [0.080] [0.112] [0.133] [0.047] [0.135]
MALE 0.664** 0.651** 0.394** 0.564** 1.016** 1.030** 0.267** 0.781**
[0.084] [0.085] [0.114] [0.133] [0.231] [0.220] [0.074] [0.196]
USCITIZEN 0.146 0.140 -0.093 -0.037 0.272 0.662** 0.132 -0.013
[0.091] [0.090] [0.129] [0.130] [0.222] [0.232] [0.074] [0.249]
RACE (3) incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 11014 11014 2586 2690 2089 3649 2637 769
Chi-square 2672.705 2732.524 943.516 600.498 850.215 20956.11 524.884
df 74 75 72 71 71 71 75 48
alphaest 4.014 3.991 2.568 3.269 5.503 7.966 0.656 2.695
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source: Based on NSF (2003): SESTAT restricted-use data file
Full Sample 
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Table A8: Performance Regressions ( PhD-Sample) 
 
Full Sample
nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp uspapp
Imp. Salary 0.088 0.263** 0.266** 0.257** 0.257** 0.180*
[0.073] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.078]
Imp. Benefits -0.022 -0.074 -0.080 -0.070 -0.076 -0.043
[0.075] [0.085] [0.085] [0.084] [0.084] [0.082]
Imp. Job Security -0.268** -0.198* -0.184* -0.185* -0.167* -0.185*
[0.059] [0.079] [0.079] [0.081] [0.080] [0.074]
Imp. Challenge 0.394** 0.288** 0.281** 0.273** 0.271** 0.227**
[0.070] [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.079]
Imp. Independence 0.114* 0.319** 0.322** 0.326** 0.326** 0.292**
[0.058] [0.067] [0.068] [0.067] [0.068] [0.066]
Imp. Advancement -0.041 0.013 0.019 0.023 0.031 0.062
[0.057] [0.068] [0.068] [0.067] [0.067] [0.063]
Imp. Responsibility -0.071 -0.117 -0.110 -0.131 -0.132 -0.115
[0.058] [0.069] [0.069] [0.070] [0.070] [0.064]
Imp. Contr. Society 0.019 -0.126* -0.126* -0.133* -0.126* -0.088
[0.049] [0.059] [0.061] [0.060] [0.060] [0.056]
HRSWORKED 0.016** 0.014** 0.011* 0.006
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
ABILITY 0.114* 0.106* 0.075
[0.052] [0.052] [0.047]
HRS x ABILITY 0.014* 0.017**
[0.006] [0.006]
Employer ID's incl.
EMSIZE: 1-10 -0.321 0.093 0.145 0.113 0.132 0.161 0.351
[0.203] [0.323] [0.326] [0.305] [0.330] [0.325] [0.334]
EMSIZE: 11-24 -0.533** -0.178 -0.181 -0.103 -0.152 -0.147 0.057
[0.197] [0.272] [0.266] [0.293] [0.281] [0.273] [0.284]
EMSIZE: 25-99 -0.523** -0.247 -0.251 -0.198 -0.255 -0.265 -0.071
[0.124] [0.136] [0.136] [0.144] [0.137] [0.138] [0.176]
EMSIZE: 100-499 -0.571** -0.257 -0.252 -0.245 -0.246 -0.240 -0.104
[0.132] [0.160] [0.161] [0.169] [0.159] [0.161] [0.189]
EMSIZE: 500-999 -0.439** -0.455 -0.446 -0.435 -0.479* -0.463* -0.105
[0.142] [0.236] [0.236] [0.223] [0.218] [0.221] [0.209]
EMSIZE: 1000-4999 -0.269** -0.196 -0.211 -0.169 -0.188 -0.191 -0.116
[0.092] [0.121] [0.121] [0.125] [0.121] [0.121] [0.140]
EMSIZE: 5000-24999 -0.210* -0.222* -0.233* -0.220* -0.216* -0.227* -0.074
[0.104] [0.098] [0.098] [0.101] [0.099] [0.098] [0.119]
NEWBUS 0.287* 0.171 0.157 0.191 0.128 0.118 0.122
[0.122] [0.157] [0.156] [0.169] [0.157] [0.155] [0.153]
IND_NAICS incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
WAPRI: basic -0.106 0.202 0.180 0.180 0.206 0.192 0.346*
[0.139] [0.170] [0.168] [0.173] [0.171] [0.170] [0.171]
WAPRI: applied 0.201* 0.243** 0.225* 0.304** 0.239** 0.227* 0.284**
[0.081] [0.092] [0.092] [0.098] [0.092] [0.092] [0.089]
WAPRI: design -0.352** -0.229 -0.234 -0.176 -0.222 -0.219 -0.092
[0.106] [0.146] [0.146] [0.154] [0.147] [0.146] [0.136]
WAPRI: computers -1.300** -1.129** -1.129** -1.075** -1.101** -1.106** -1.001**
[0.109] [0.150] [0.149] [0.157] [0.151] [0.151] [0.135]
WA_NONRD -0.045 0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.009 0.006





HD_FIELD incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
LN_SUPDIR 0.298** 0.275** 0.277** 0.233** 0.250** 0.258** 0.289**
[0.041] [0.052] [0.052] [0.054] [0.051] [0.051] [0.050]
HDTENURE -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 0.003
[0.013] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.017] [0.018] [0.016]
HDTENURE_SQ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
JOBDEGREE 0.215** 0.013 0.021 -0.007 0.012 0.020 0.040
[0.058] [0.063] [0.064] [0.068] [0.064] [0.064] [0.063]
MALE 0.664** 0.392** 0.399** 0.387** 0.380** 0.385** 0.400**
[0.084] [0.100] [0.100] [0.106] [0.100] [0.101] [0.102]
USCITIZEN 0.146 0.149 0.138 0.124 0.142 0.124 0.043
[0.091] [0.108] [0.108] [0.118] [0.109] [0.109] [0.106]
RACE (3) incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 11014 2805 2805 2805 2805 2805 2805
Chi-square 2672.705 1669.722 1657.054 1575.238 1683.641 1768.159 9122.042
df 74 71 72 64 72 74 196
alphaest 4.014 2.434 2.425 2.518 2.42 2.404 2.053
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source: Based on NSF (2003): SESTAT restricted-use data file
PhD Sample 
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Table A9: Alternative Performance Measures 
 
nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg nbreg
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
uspapp uspapp uspgrt uspgrt uspcom uspcom publication publication
Imp. Salary 0.088 0.102 0.047 0.051 0.094 0.104 -0.052 -0.025
[0.073] [0.072] [0.069] [0.069] [0.085] [0.085] [0.073] [0.072]
Imp. Benefits -0.022 -0.019 0.010 0.012 0.032 0.030 -0.178* -0.196*
[0.075] [0.074] [0.069] [0.069] [0.089] [0.089] [0.083] [0.085]
Imp. Job Security -0.268** -0.255** -0.238** -0.231** -0.291** -0.282** 0.038 0.063
[0.059] [0.059] [0.062] [0.063] [0.079] [0.080] [0.062] [0.061]
Imp. Challenge 0.394** 0.373** 0.349** 0.339** 0.401** 0.382** 0.277** 0.254**
[0.070] [0.069] [0.080] [0.080] [0.106] [0.106] [0.082] [0.081]
Imp. Independence 0.114* 0.123* 0.211** 0.214** 0.173* 0.179* 0.001 0.012
[0.058] [0.057] [0.067] [0.066] [0.086] [0.086] [0.083] [0.079]
Imp. Advancement -0.041 -0.048 -0.165** -0.165** -0.197** -0.193* -0.032 -0.053
[0.057] [0.056] [0.061] [0.061] [0.076] [0.076] [0.063] [0.063]
Imp. Responsibility -0.071 -0.085 -0.126 -0.131* -0.049 -0.056 -0.035 -0.050
[0.058] [0.058] [0.065] [0.065] [0.082] [0.082] [0.068] [0.070]
Imp. Contr. Society 0.019 0.019 -0.012 -0.016 -0.023 -0.032 0.015 0.020
[0.049] [0.050] [0.056] [0.056] [0.074] [0.075] [0.058] [0.059]
HRSWORKED 0.019** 0.011* 0.017** 0.029**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
EMSIZE: 1-10 -0.321 -0.283 -0.197 -0.181 -0.095 -0.070 0.576 0.521
[0.203] [0.202] [0.194] [0.194] [0.232] [0.237] [0.371] [0.337]
EMSIZE: 11-24 -0.533** -0.509* -0.368 -0.345 -0.233 -0.223 0.125 0.168
[0.197] [0.202] [0.238] [0.242] [0.229] [0.229] [0.178] [0.176]
EMSIZE: 25-99 -0.523** -0.526** -0.427** -0.420** -0.231 -0.221 -0.280* -0.268*
[0.124] [0.124] [0.147] [0.147] [0.181] [0.182] [0.128] [0.126]
EMSIZE: 100-499 -0.571** -0.561** -0.535** -0.522** -0.311* -0.285 -0.407** -0.362**
[0.132] [0.130] [0.119] [0.119] [0.149] [0.149] [0.102] [0.104]
EMSIZE: 500-999 -0.439** -0.433** -0.397* -0.387* -0.188 -0.183 -0.142 -0.108
[0.142] [0.139] [0.163] [0.163] [0.189] [0.187] [0.157] [0.153]
EMSIZE: 1000-4999 -0.269** -0.256** -0.262* -0.255* -0.072 -0.064 -0.109 -0.081
[0.092] [0.092] [0.105] [0.105] [0.137] [0.137] [0.106] [0.107]
EMSIZE: 5000-24999 -0.210* -0.191 -0.241* -0.233* -0.074 -0.060 0.104 0.141
[0.104] [0.105] [0.097] [0.097] [0.127] [0.128] [0.151] [0.153]
NEWBUS 0.287* 0.239 0.028 0.003 -0.054 -0.099 0.104 0.049
[0.122] [0.123] [0.131] [0.132] [0.166] [0.170] [0.131] [0.128]
IND_NAICS incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
WAPRI: basic -0.106 -0.085 0.014 0.027 -0.772** -0.754** 0.761** 0.778**
[0.139] [0.138] [0.163] [0.164] [0.241] [0.247] [0.149] [0.152]
WAPRI: applied 0.201* 0.201* 0.147 0.148 -0.115 -0.118 0.423** 0.419**
[0.081] [0.080] [0.088] [0.088] [0.116] [0.117] [0.078] [0.079]
WAPRI: design -0.352** -0.346** -0.424** -0.425** -0.594** -0.605** -0.239* -0.246*
[0.106] [0.106] [0.107] [0.107] [0.125] [0.126] [0.117] [0.116]
WAPRI: computers -1.300** -1.286** -1.408** -1.403** -1.373** -1.369** -0.787** -0.752**
[0.109] [0.109] [0.130] [0.129] [0.157] [0.154] [0.136] [0.134]
WA_NONRD -0.045 -0.060* -0.007 -0.016 0.021 0.007 0.031 0.002
[0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.031] [0.031] [0.028] [0.028]
DEGREE: masters 0.469** 0.471** 0.523** 0.520** 0.398** 0.392** 0.446** 0.433**
[0.097] [0.097] [0.109] [0.108] [0.135] [0.134] [0.131] [0.134]
DEGREE: phd 1.580** 1.560** 1.600** 1.586** 1.302** 1.282** 1.774** 1.724**
[0.084] [0.085] [0.100] [0.101] [0.125] [0.127] [0.111] [0.111]
HD_FIELD incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
LN_SUPDIR 0.298** 0.272** 0.326** 0.310** 0.378** 0.349** 0.279** 0.241**
[0.041] [0.041] [0.046] [0.046] [0.057] [0.057] [0.050] [0.051]
HDTENURE -0.006 -0.008 0.092** 0.091** 0.115** 0.114** -0.145** -0.148**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.015] [0.015] [0.019] [0.019] [0.011] [0.011]
HDTENURE_SQ 0.000 0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 0.003** 0.003**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
JOBDEGREE 0.215** 0.214** 0.202** 0.201** 0.239** 0.235** 0.341** 0.332**
[0.058] [0.057] [0.062] [0.062] [0.079] [0.078] [0.057] [0.058]
MALE 0.664** 0.651** 0.770** 0.764** 0.711** 0.702** 0.210* 0.188
[0.084] [0.085] [0.095] [0.096] [0.126] [0.127] [0.095] [0.097]
USCITIZEN 0.146 0.140 0.082 0.078 0.043 0.029 -0.709** -0.715**
[0.091] [0.090] [0.110] [0.109] [0.143] [0.145] [0.122] [0.122]
RACE (3) incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014 11014
Chi-square 2672.705 2732.524 1987.484 2012.722 1081.814 1107.347 3023.609 3204.696
df 74 75 74 75 74 75 74 75
alphaest 4.014 3.991 4.499 4.491 6.841 6.811 3.431 3.362
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source: Based on NSF (2003): SESTAT restricted-use data file